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Abstract 
Title of Dissertation:  An Analysis of the Implementation of Flag States 
Obligations in Indonesia: 
 A case study for flag State performance 
 
 
Degree:  MSc  
 
The dissertation is an analysis of the implementation of flag States obligations in 
Indonesia by means of assessing its performance. The study emphasized the flag 
State duties and responsibilities related to the administrative, social and technical 
duties as highlighted in the UNCLOS Article 94 and 217. 
The parameters utilized by the International Chamber of Shipping [ICS] when 
assessing flag State performance are contemplated and applied for the Indonesian 
flag. Such parameters are: (i) the ratification of major international maritime treaties; 
(ii) the use of Recognised Organisation [RO] complying with resolution A.739(18); 
(iii) mandatory reporting requirements; (iv) PSC inspection records; and  (v) the 
average age of the fleets. One of the major indicators, the PSC detention record in the 
Tokyo MoU, positions the Indonesian flag on the “black list” which suggests 
negative or underperforming implementation and enforcement of flag States 
obligations. 
In detail, the ships detention reports published by the Tokyo MoU were analyzed, 
from the period of 2012 to 2015. The aspect of delegation authority to the RO is also 
reviewed. Moreover, the relationship between Maritime Administration (as a flag 
State enforcer) and the RO with respect to the authorization of delegation, is 
examined. In lieu of the detainable deficiencies, the author has distinguished the 
responsible part, whether RO or the flag State itself. The analysis results were 
collated and evaluated in comparison with the overall data of theTokyo MoU as a 
region.  
Additionally, related data concerning the aspect of ratification of the international 
maritime treaties, reporting requirements and the average age of fleets are thoroughly 
examined. Furthermore, the analysis result is discussed for evaluation and possible 
improvement. 
The concluding chapter illustrates the result of the analysis and discusses the possible 
advancement measures. Several relevant recommendations are proposed for the 
potential improvement of Indonesia’s performance at regional and international 
levels. 
 
KEYWORDS: flag State performance, recognized organization, port State control, 
Tokyo MoU, delegation authority, ship detention 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Background of the study 
There are many stakeholders that play an important role in the development of 
international shipping. Among those, the International Maritime Organization [IMO], 
States, RO, Shipowners/shipping companies and Seafarers. Each stakeholder has 
their roles and responsibilities; for instance, the IMO as one of the United Nations 
[UN] specialized agency, is responsible for developing international standards 
concerning safety as well as the pollution prevention related to ships and shipping 
activities. On the other hand, States have responsibilities for implementing and 
enforcing these international standards and regulations (Barchue, 2009). 
In terms of maritime safety, security and protection of the marine environment, 
the roles of the States are divided based on their capacity as flag States, whose ships 
fly the flag; port States, whose ports or anchorages ships call; and coastal States, 
whose coasts ships pass. The general obligations and responsibilities of the States are 
highlighted in the IMO Instrument Implementation Code [III Code] (IMO, 2013a). In 
detail a Flag State has the primary responsibility to have in place an adequate and 
effective system to exercise control over ships entitled to fly their flag, and to ensure 
that they comply with relevant international rules and regulations. Recalling the 
requirement under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea [UNCLOS] 
(1982), flag States’ responsibilities are also mentioned in the Articles 94 and 217. 
Since most ships operate globally, this may present obstacles for the flag States 
when exercising and enforcing their obligations over their registered ships. They 
might face difficulties to effectively and efficiently control their ships. The limited 
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number of inspectors is considered  the main problem for most maritime 
administrations, especially in developing countries like Indonesia (Fikri, 2007, p. 
21). Also, it was noted that in some cases, the capacity and capability of their 
resources (marine inspectors) to perform all the requirements of the applicable 
conventions is limited. Indeed, it was recognized that the workload of marine 
inspectors, particularly in Indonesia was remarkably very high, since the limited 
number of marine inspectors compared to the amount of flag States obligations may 
not suffice (Fikri, 2007, p. 32).  
A similar figure is still reflected in the current situation of Indonesia. 
According to the Clarksons report (2016, p. 3), by the end of 2015, there were 7,994 
ships registered under Indonesian flag (see Table 1-1). These ships were mainly 
employed in coastal and inter-islands shipping and operated in 682 ports1 
(Directorate General of Sea Transportation [DGST], 2014, pp. 53-67). Since the 
number of marine inspectors is (only) 392, not all of the ports possess permanently 
assigned inspectors. Also, it shows that the ratio between the number of ships 
compared to the number of marine inspectors was quite high. Considering also the 
high number of ship’s calls, sea ports involved, and the coverage area of operations, 
a challenge arises for marine inspectors when they also need to carry out PSC 
inspections.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 A total 682 ports comprises of 111 commercial ports and 571 non-commercial ports. 
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Table 1-1: Flag State fleets 
 
Source: Clarksons research (2016, p. 3) 
The above description leads to the topic of the implementation of flag States 
obligations. The practical means of analyzing the implementation of flag State 
obligations is by assessing its performance through certain indicators since there are 
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many aspects that could be considered when assessing the flag States performance. 
For instance, the ICS uses the following indicators:  
a) Ratification of major international maritime treaties:  
 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 including 
1988 Protocol [SOLAS];  
 International Convention  on Standards of Training, Certification and 
Watchkeeping for Seafarers, 1978, as amended [STCW];  
 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973 
as modified by Protocol of 1978 [MARPOL];  
 The International Convention on Load Line, 1966 [ICLL]: 
 Maritime Labour Convention, 2006 [MLC]; and  
 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 
1992 and International Convention on the Establishment of an 
International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1992 
[CLC/Fund 92] 
b) The use of RO complying with resolution A.739(18) 
c) Mandatory reporting requirements to the IMO and ILO 
d) Record of Port State Control inspection of ships [PSC], for instance, Tokyo 
MoU 
e) The average age of the fleet 
f) Attendance or participation at IMO meetings 
Moreover, ICS (2015) publishes the report of flag State’s performance in 
tabular form. The performance level is symbolized by the green and red squares. The 
green squares indicated positive performance indicators while the negative 
performance is indicated by the red squares. In the above mentioned report, 
Indonesia’s negative performance is highlighted in several areas. One of the 
contributing factors that caused its poor performance is the number of ship detentions 
in the various regional areas (i.e. Tokyo MoU, Paris MoU and U.S. Coast Guard).  
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According to Tokyo MoU report (2015a, p. 26), during the periods of 2013 – 
2015, a total of 546 ships were inspected, of which 85 were detained contributing to 
a detention factor of 15.15 %. As a result, Indonesia is positioned in the black-list 
together with twelve other countries. Considering that the list published by the Tokyo 
MoU is open to the public which follows the ‘name and shame’ attitude of the 
various MoUs, being on the “black list” gives a bad reputation for the flag States 
(Fikri, 2007, p. 4). Therefore, some States react positively by seeking possible 
improvements by setting higher safety standards or by simplifying the administration 
process. Perhaps, that is why the number of blacklisted flags has decreased 
continuously over the past few years (Tokyo MoU, 2015a). For many reasons,  it is 
in the interest of all States to maintain their good reputation among other States. By 
becoming a reputable and quality flag State, it will bring benefits to them not only in 
technical matters, but also in financial aspects. Therefore, all of these reasons 
motivates the author to conduct this study.  
1.2 Objective and research questions 
Following the background information delineated above, there is a need to 
improve Indonesia’s performance  (i.e. deleted from the black list). Therefore, the 
writer outlined the objectives of this study, which have as a starting point, the 
analysis of the implementation of flag States obligations in Indonesia. A case study 
for flag State performance is used as the basis of the analysis. The author views that 
the improvement of the implementation aspect can be reflected in the improvement 
of performance levels either at regional or international levels, such as in the Asia-
Pacific region. Following that reason, this study also covers the analysis of the 
relationship between Maritime Administration and RO. Records of PSC inspections 
in the Tokyo MoU are used as a basis for the analysis.  
To achieve the above outlined objectives, the following research questions 
need to be addressed:  
(i) What is the current situation of Indonesia’s performance? 
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(ii) How does the good relationship between Maritime Administration in Indonesia 
(as a flag State enforcer) and Classification Societies (as RO) functions in 
terms of a delegation of authority? 
(iii) What are the possible measures for flag States to address issues concerning the 
implementation of its obligations? 
1.3 Scope of study and methodology 
It is not the aim of this study to attempt a holistic discussion of enforcement 
and implementation of flag States obligations. Due to the limitation in source and 
data availability, this study focuses on the analysis of Indonesia’s performance for 
the period of 2012 – 2015. The analysis covers all aspects used by the ICS except the 
aspect of participation in IMO meetings and is mainly performed based on the annual 
PSC inspection record published by the Tokyo MoU. In addition, the related 
documents on the reporting requirements are also examined. 
With respect to the detention list, the data consists of detention lists of 
Indonesian flagged vessel’s to include the following information: 
- Ship’s particular. 
Provides information about the name of the ship, IMO number, nationality, year 
of built, gross tonnage [GT], ship type, classification society and company name. 
- Deficiencies related to RO. 
Provides information about the responsibility of the RO, concerning the 
deficiencies found. 
- Place of detention, including date of detention and date of release. 
- Nature of deficiencies. 
With respect to the nature of deficiencies, information is given in general terms 
and associated with the specific numbers or codes according to the Tokyo MoU 
Deficiency Codes. 
Furthermore, the collected data was processed and analyzed by using a simple 
quantitative method with the aid of Microsoft Excel as a tool.   
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1.4 Structure and organization 
In order to effectively accomplish the objective as stated above, this 
dissertation is arranged in several chapters. The first chapter focuses on the 
background as to why this study needs to be performed. The objective, the scope, and 
the methodology used in this study are also elaborated. 
Chapter 2 covers a literature review of the roles and responsibility of flag 
States. The discussion covers the flag States duties in the aspect of administrative, 
social and technical matters. The overview of the RO and the issues concerning 
delegation authority as well as the aspect of monitoring schemes (oversight program) 
are covered.  
Chapter 3 provides a discussion related to the PSC. There is a review of the 
existing PSC regime applied in the Asia-pacific region (Tokyo MoU) and an 
overview of the black, grey and white list concept. In addition, the mechanism of the 
selection of ships for inspection, deficiencies, detention and criteria for attributing 
deficiencies to the RO are also discussed.  
Chapter 4 provides the analysis of the current status of Indonesia’s 
performance with respect to the aspects described in Chapter 2 and 3. Regarding the 
aspect of PSC inspection, the analysis was carried out based on the detention list 
issued by the Tokyo MoU, during 2012 to 2015. In addition, the analysis also covers 
the following factors: (i) who is responsible for the deficiencies, (ii) the most 
detainable deficiencies, (iii) the distinction of deficiencies, (iv) the average age of 
detained ship, (v) the most type of ship detained, and (vi) the analysis of the general 
pattern of deficiencies each year. Furthermore, the analysis results are compared with 
the data available in the annual report (Tokyo MoU). Chapter 4 also provides a 
discussion on the nature of the relationship between Maritime Administration and 
RO. As a complement, the existing relationship between Maritime Administration 
(as a flag State enforcer) and classification societies (as the RO) in Indonesia are 
discussed as well.  
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Chapter 5 specifically provides the discussion of the analysis result. The last 
chapter (Chapter 6) presents a conclusion and summary of the whole analysis and 
discussion. Several recommendations are proposed as a complement to the  
discussion.  
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2. Flag State and Recognized Organization 
2.1 Definition of flag State 
It is beyond the scope of this study to have a broad and comprehensive 
discussion on what is the legal concept and correct definition of a flag State. Instead, 
the concept of a flag State as related to the international shipping and the 
international maritime law is used in this study. Mansel (2009, p. 18), highlighted 
some definitions of flag States by citing the academic work of other relevant authors 
in the field:  
 “the State which has granted to a ship the right to sail under its flag” 2 
  ‘the State whose nationality the ship possesses” 3 
 “a State whose flag a ship flies and is entitled to fly” 4 
 “the State in whose territory a ship is registered” 5 
Following the above definitions, there is the term “registration” which is 
normally used to refer to the attribution of national status of the ship. Mukherjee 
(1993) stated that the concept of the flag in the maritime field is virtually 
synonymous with ship registration. Hence, very often flag State is denoted by a term 
of “register”. Once a ship is registered under a specific flag, such flag will issue a set 
of documents that have functions not only as prima facie evidence of title and 
ownership of the ship, but also as confirmation of nationality and the right to fly the 
national flag.  
                                                          
2 Cited from Churchill and Lowe (1999, p.208) 
3 Cited from Akehurst (1988, p.182) 
4 Cited from Convention on Conditions for the Registration of Ships 1986, Article 2 
5 Cited from United Nation Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 1982, Article 91(1) 
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The basic understanding of the flag State concept should be assumed as similar 
with the concept of two sides of the same coin, since it has the rights on the one side 
and the obligations on the other. This dualistic concept is reflected in the provisions 
of the UNCLOS Article 90, 91 and 94. On the one hand, Article 90 and 91 stated that 
by attributing the nationality to the ships, flag States have given “the right to sail 
ships flying its flag on the high seas” and the right to “fix conditions for the grant of 
its nationality and registering ships in its territory.” On the other hand, under Article 
94, the flag State is bound by duty to “effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control 
over administrative, technical and social matters over ships flying its flag.” 
To effectively analyze the flag State responsibility, it is necessary to look at the 
various types of flag States. A broad discussion concerning the issues in the 
description and categorization of flag States has evolved. One of the categorizations 
was proposed by Mansel (2009, p. 101), who grouped the flag States into four 
categories: National flag State, Quasi-National flag State, International flag State and 
Pseudo-National flag State. According to the Ministry of Transport [MoT] (2006), 
Indonesia is deemed to be classified as a National flag State whose register is 
available only to Indonesian citizens or entities established under Indonesian law and 
domiciled in Indonesia. Moreover, such register is operated by Maritime 
Administration namely the “Directorate General of Sea Transportation” [DGST].  
2.2 Flag State duties and responsibilities 
There are many treaties that deal with flag States duties (Takei, 2013, p. 101). 
However, it is not practicable to enumerate each of them exhaustively since it is out 
of the scope and purpose of this study. Instead, along with the objectives stated 
before, this study will analyze the basic structure of flag State duties and 
responsibility as described in the UNCLOS under Article 94 and 217. In order to 
make the discussion flow smoothly, it is necessary to distinguish the flag State 
responsibility into three categories: administrative, social and technical. 
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2.2.1. Flag State administrative duties 
2.2.1.1. Ratification of major international treaties 
It has been determined that a majority of flag States are Member States of the 
IMO,6 and most of them have ratified the major IMO conventions. Concerning the 
administrative matters, ratification of the IMO instruments is considered as the one 
aspect of the flag State duties. This argument was based on the provision in the 
SOLAS Article I(b), which required that “The Contracting Government undertake to 
promulgate all laws, decrees, orders and regulation and to take all other steps which 
may be necessary to give the present Convention full and complete effect, ...” (IMO, 
1974).  
In addition, such provision was also highlighted in the UNCLOS Article 
94(2)(b), which mentioned that “every State shall assume jurisdiction under its 
internal law ...” Moreover, a similar provision also emanated in the III Code Part I, 
which was adopted under Resolution A.1070(28). It is required that if any IMO 
instruments entered into force, the State must take initial actions to implement and 
enforce its provisions and also give complete effect through the adoption into its 
national legislation (IMO, 2013a). However, in the implementation of those 
provisions, the question is, therefore, raised about how the State should transform the 
international treaties into its national legislation. 
To answer the above question, in fact, there are two basic theories concerning 
the relationship between the international and domestic or national law that are 
generally applied by States. According to Malanczuk (1997, p. 63), the first doctrine 
called the “monistic” theory, which has a unitary perception that both -the 
international and national law- are forming one part of unity and being in the same 
legal order. It means that once the international treaties have been ratified, it does not 
need to be incorporated into the national law, since it has effected automatically to 
                                                          
6 IMO currently has 171 Member States and 3 Associate Members. Indonesia accepted as IMO 
Member States since 1961. See  http://www.imo.org/en/About/Membership/Pages/MemberStates.aspx 
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the national legislation. The second doctrine is called “dualistic” theory, which 
assumes that the international law and national law are  two separate legal systems  
independent each other. Hence, even though such State has ratified the international 
treaties, it will not be binding unless it has been incorporated into its national law. 
2.2.1.2. Mandatory reporting requirement 
Another element that is also considered as the part of flag State administrative 
duties is mandatory reporting to the IMO and ILO. Considering the fact that 
information covering the extent to which flags have complied with certain reporting 
requirements is not always available in the public domain, such reports are certainly 
needed by the IMO and ILO as a means to encourage the implementation of the 
Conventions. In addition, such reports can also be used by the IMO and ILO as tools 
to assess the effectiveness of the implementation of the Convention and for statistical 
purpose.  
Meanwhile, as an indicator to the assessment of flag State performance, ICS 
only used the aspect of submitted reports required by the ILO. However, to make the 
analysis in this study more comprehensive, both aspects of the reporting requirement 
(reporting to IMO and ILO) are discussed proportionally. 
2.2.1.2.1. Mandatory reporting requirement to the IMO 
This part discusses the categories that are mandatory to be reported to the IMO: 
1. Mandatory reporting requirement under MARPOL 
The reporting requirement under MARPOL emanated under the following 
parts: 
 Articles 8, 11 and 12, 
 Annex I: Regulation 38, 
 Annex II: Regulation 18, 
 Annex IV: Regulation 12, 
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 Annex V: Regulation 7, and 
 Annex VI: Regulation 17 
As guidance, flag States should refer to the Circular MEPC/Circ.318, which 
contains the format for a mandatory reporting system under MARPOL (IMO, 1996). 
According to this Circular, flag States are requested to submit their reports by 30 
September, annually. 
2. Mandatory reporting requirement regarding casualty investigation  
This requirement described under SOLAS Regulation 21, MARPOL Article 12 
and also under  ICLL Article 23, which mentioned that: 
“Each Contracting Government undertakes to supply the Organization 
with pertinent information concerning the findings of such 
investigations...” 
Moreover, obligations concerning accidents and casualty investigations are 
also highlighted in the UNCLOS Article 94(7). Furthermore, this provision is also 
recalled in the III Code (IMO, 2013a) by stating that the investigation of a marine 
casualty and marine incident should be conducted in accordance with the Casualty 
Investigation Code (IMO, 2008a).  It is noted under Chapter 6 of this Code that the 
safety investigation shall be conducted into every “very serious accident.” The aims 
of such investigation are to prevent marine casualties and incidents from reoccurring 
in the future.  Regarding the reporting requirement, it was also noted under Chapter 
14 of this Code that: 
“The marine safety investigating State(s) shall submit the final version of 
a marine safety investigation report to the Organization for every marine 
safety investigation conducted into a very serious marine casualty.” 
Furthermore, Paragraph 41 of the III Code requires that the complete 
investigation report including observations found shall be forwarded to the IMO 
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through the Global Integrated Shipping Information System [GISIS]7 and it becomes 
an integral part of compliance with the Conventions. The purpose is: (i) to analyze 
the report to produce lessons to be learned, (ii) to detect potential trends on safety 
issues, and (iii) to take proper actions in order to prevent recurrence of marine 
casualties and incidents in the future. The IMO (2015a) has listed several results of 
lessons learned from each particular accident type. 
Moreover, according to the IMO (2012), the analysis result of the investigation 
reports can also contribute to the development of a rule-making process or rule 
amendments. For instance, the analysis result can be used as a basis for performing 
the Formal Safety Assessment [FSA]. One example of IMO regulations developed 
by using the FSA approach is the International Code for Ships Operating in Polar 
Waters [Polar Code] (IMO, 2014a). 
3. Mandatory reporting requirement concerning flag State authorization to the RO 
This requirement described under SOLAS Regulation 6 and ICLL Article 23 
which mentioned that: 
“The Administration shall notify the Organization of the specific 
responsibilities and conditions of the authority delegated to nominated 
surveyors or recognized organizations.” 
The implementation of the above provision should refer to the MSC/Circ.1010-
MEPC/Circ.382.8 According to this Circular, flag States are requested to submit the 
specific report to the IMO, which consists of the information regarding 
responsibilities and conditions of the authorization. However, many States argued 
that the existing reporting mechanism -by sending the report to the IMO office- were 
considered to be ineffective and also inefficient. To overcome this issue, IMO 
                                                          
7 GISIS module on marine casualties and incidents, see 
https://gisis.imo.org/Members/MCI/Default.aspx 
8 MSC/Circ.1010-MEPC/Circ.382 Communication of information on the authorization of Recognized 
Organizations (ROs). 
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established a computer system which enables the mechanism of the direct reporting 
system, namely GISIS (IMO, 2009).  
4. Mandatory reporting requirement under STCW Convention 
This requirement is described under STCW Convention Article IV and STCW 
Code Part A Section A-I/7. It is required that States shall communicate the report to 
the IMO Secretary-General, detailing their actions regarding compliance with the 
STCW Convention. Following to these Provisions, Regulation I/7 paragraph 2 
requires that when such information has been received and confirmed, the Secretary-
General shall submit the evaluation report to the MSC.  
Furthermore, as mandated by Regulation I/7 paragraph 5, the Secretary-
General shall maintain a list of so-called “competent persons” who may be called 
upon to assist him/her in evaluating the report submitted by States, as well as in the 
preparation of the evaluation report to the MSC. Subsequently, MSC approved the 
list of a competent person and circulated in the MSC/Circ.797 which is revised 
periodically. The last revision of the list of competent persons was contained in the 
MSC.1/Circ.797/Rev.27 which was issued on 20 July 2015 (IMO, 2015b). 
2.2.1.2.2. Reporting requirement to the ILO 
This requirement is described under ILO Constitution Article 19, 22 and 35.9 It 
is required that: 
“Each of the Members agrees to make an annual report to the 
International Labour Office on the measures which it has taken to give 
effect to the provisions of Conventions to which it is a party.” 
In accordance with the decision taken by the ILO Governing Body, the reports 
should be sent to the ILO Office between 1 June and 1 September of each year (ILO, 
2015, p. 13). Furthermore, the information and reports that have been submitted will 
                                                          
9 Text of ILO Constitution is available in the ILO website. See 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:62:0::NO:62:P62_LIST_ENTRIE_ID:2453907:NO 
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be examined by the ILO Committee of Experts.10 Furthermore, this Committee will 
produce the annual report on the application of Conventions and Recommendations. 
As such, the compliance in submitting the required reports was used by the ICS as an 
indicator when assessing the flag State performance.  
2.2.2. Flag State social duties 
The provision concerning social duties of flag State is described in the 
UNCLOS Article 94(3)(b) which required the State to take certain measures 
concerning “the manning of ships, labour conditions and the training of crews, 
taking into account the applicable international instruments.” The Convention 
which deals with this provision is MLC 2006 (ILO, 2006). The MLC 2006 covers 
the safety standards, social security measures, and shipboard conditions of 
employment and living arrangements.  
Article V of MLC 2006 contains the clause of “no more favorable treatment.” 
It means that ships flying the flag of the State that has ratified the Convention will 
not be placed at a competitive disadvantage as compared to the ships flying the flag 
of non-ratified States (ILO, 2006). As such, this principle will ensure that the “level 
playing field” is maintained. For instance, in the case of Indonesia, even though 
MLC has not yet ratified, Indonesian ships will receive similar treatment as the ship 
of the State that has already ratified the Convention.  
2.2.3. Flag State technical duties 
The provision concerning the technical duties of a flag State are enumerated in 
the UNCLOS Article 94(3)(a)(b)(c) and Article 94(4). Those provisions deal with the 
safety aspect of the ship which covers, inter alia, the construction, equipment and 
seaworthiness; the manning of the ship as well as the training of crews; the use of 
                                                          
10 For the update list of members of the Committee of Experts, see 
http://www.ilo.org/global/standards/applying-and-promoting-international-labour-
standards/committee-of-experts-on-the-application-of-conventions-and-
recommendations/WCMS_192093/lang--en/index.htm 
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signals; the maintenance of communications; the prevention of collision and the 
prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution.  
It is required that flag States shall take necessary measures to ensure safety at 
sea by performing surveys periodically by utilizing their qualified surveyors, as 
mandated by UNCLOS Article 94(4)(a). Furthermore, in performing such measures, 
according to Article 94(5), States are also required to conform to the “generally 
accepted” international regulations, procedures and practices. SOLAS is one example 
of a Convention that is considered as a  “generally accepted” Convention (IMO, as 
cited in Takei, 2013, p. 117). The aspect concerning the safety at sea, particularly 
with respect to the survey and certification requirements are enumerated in SOLAS 
Chapter I, Regulation 6 to 20.  
2.3 Delegation of flag State responsibility to the RO 
The provision of UNCLOS Article 94(4)(a) required that ships must be 
surveyed periodically at the specific interval by qualified flag State surveyors; a task 
which is generally delegated to ROs due to lack of personnel and resources. In 
relation to the delegation of authority, however, there is a general indication that 
some States do not always perform satisfactorily (Takei, 2013, p. 98) and not in 
accordance with IMO Resolution A.739(18) which will be discussed further below. 
This is also reflected in the annual report on flag State performance published by the 
ICS periodically (ICS, 2015). As seen in Table 2-1, it is shown that many States still 
indicate negative performance. Lack of control by flag States over their ships is 
considered one of the main factors that contributed to its poor performance. Since, as 
discussed in Chapter 1.1, it was noted that some States have issues concerning lack 
of capacity and capability of their resources. 
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Table 2-1: Flag States performance, as of 1 December 2015 
 
Source: ICS (2015) 
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In addition, the development of “open registry” is also considered as a 
contributing factor to that condition. When most of the ships are operated globally, 
the flag State might face difficulties in effectively and efficiently controlling their 
registered ships. Furthermore, the development of open registries also raised an 
enormous burden on the flag States in the implementation and enforcement of their 
duties and responsibilities. UNCTAD (2015, p. 41) reported that about seventy 
percent of the total world tonnage is registered under open registries. All of these 
issues, therefore, became a basic argument for the implementation of the delegation 
authority. 
In fact, many flag States used the provisions of SOLAS Regulation I/6; ICLL 
Article 13, MARPOL Annex I Regulation 4 and Annex II regulation 10; and 
Tonnage Convention Article 6 as a legal basis to delegate their duties and 
responsibilities to the RO. In practice, it was accepted among states that delegation of 
authority is not only widely applied but also legitimate.  
As a guideline for the flag States in the implementation of delegation 
authorities, the IMO adopted Resolutions A.739(18) and A.789(19). Furthermore, to 
enhance the existing resolutions, the IMO adopted Resolution MSC.349(92) on 21 
June 2013 (IMO, 2013b). This code is called the RO Code and it became mandatory 
under the amendments of SOLAS Chapter XI-1/1, which entered into force on 1 
January 2015. Hence, from 1 January 2015, this code came into effect and replaces 
the previous resolutions (Resolution A.739(18) and A.789(19)). 
Following the above description, it was described that the flag State delegated 
and authorized its duties and responsibilities to the organizations, which is called 
RO. However, it should be emphasized that, not all organizations can be considered 
and defined as RO. The definition of RO is provided in the RO Code: 
“Recognized organization (RO) means an organization that has been assessed 
by a flag State, and found to comply with this part of the RO Code.” 
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Under this Code, several requirements must be fulfilled by the organization 
before being recognized as RO. This Code also provides the guidelines which 
contain minimum criteria against which organizations are assessed towards 
recognition and authorization and also provides guidelines for the oversight program. 
The code consists of three main parts: 
i. the mandatory requirements that the organization shall fulfill to be recognized 
by the flag State (part 1); 
ii. the mandatory requirements that RO shall fulfill when performing statutory 
certification and services on behalf of flag State and the mandatory 
requirements that flag State shall adhere to when performing authorization to 
the RO (part 2); 
iii. guidelines for the oversight program to the RO (part 3). 
By considering the provisions in the RO Code, Mansell (2009, p. 139) opined 
that the organizations which are prone to be satisfied and complied with those 
requirements are mostly Classification Societies.  
With respect to the relationship between the flag State and RO, both of them 
should make an effort to fulfill their mandatory requirements in accordance with the 
RO Code. For instance, flag States, prior to giving authorization to the RO, shall 
confirm that such RO has the capability and capacity to exercise the delegated task(s) 
in compliance with the international and national legislation. The flag State shall not 
authorize functions beyond the RO’s capabilities.  
In addition, a flag State is obliged to establish the legal basis in which the 
authorization is administered, for instance, by providing formal written agreement 
with the RO that contains the detailed scope of authorization. Concerning the 
element to be included in the agreement, flag State may refer to the Appendix 3 of 
RO Code and MSC/Circ.710-MEPC/Circ.307 (IMO, 1995). 
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2.4 Requirement of monitoring scheme of the RO 
Following the above discussion, a key factor in assessing the effectiveness of 
the delegation of authority is the ‘monitoring’ aspect. The provision regarding a 
monitoring scheme over RO is provided in part 3 of RO Code section 5.1 which 
stated that: 
“The flag State should establish or participate in an oversight programme 
with adequate resources for monitoring of, and communication with, its RO(s) 
in order to...” 
Monitoring activities are needed to confirm that the RO is performing the 
delegated task(s) in accordance with the agreement that has been made and also in 
compliance with the international standards.  
Further, a monitoring scheme is one of the flag State’s obligations that was 
raised when they have delegated their authority to the RO. Concerning the 
implementation of the monitoring scheme, IMO (2013a) explained that means of 
monitoring could be performed in several ways, for instance, in the form of audits, 
inspections and audit observations.  
There are at least two underlying reasons behind the requirement of a 
monitoring scheme for RO. They are:  
1. Classification societies as the RO could perform dual functions: private and 
public functions 
Once the classification societies -as the RO- obtains authorization from the 
Administration, the classification society may still perform a dualistic and 
ambiguous function (Lagoni, as cited in Takei, 2013, p. 122). It can be assumed 
that such classification society could become the extension hand of the 
Administration. In other words, the classification society will be performing a 
public function. Meanwhile, the same classification society could also perform its 
class tasks for shipowners, which is considered as a private function.  
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People from classification societies believe that this dualism concept is 
advantageous for the reason of simplicity and efficiency. Moreover, some authors 
stated that this is a compromise since all parties involved will mutually benefit. 
The Administrations with their limited resources can still perform their duties, 
whilst shipowners will be easily accessing the required surveyors with a 
worldwide network, and subsequently, the classification society receives 
substantial revenue for its performances (Fikri, 2007, p. 10).  
However, other authors stated that there is a potentially unhealthy 
relationship between those parties since a classification society might still 
perform simultaneously as a public and private entity (Mansell, 2009, p. 128). In 
addition, Barchue (2009) claimed that some ROs also have other business 
interests with ships registered in the flag State that has authorized such RO. This 
condition leads to the intensification of commercial pressures on the RO 
concerned, which sometimes create conflicts between the role of the flag State’s 
inspector and his commercial interest as the class surveyor of the ship.  
Irrespective of the pros and cons discussed before, the flag State should 
remain aware of the provision of SOLAS regulation I/6(d) which stated that: 
“in every case, the Administration shall fully guarantee the completeness 
and efficiency of the inspection and survey, and shall undertake to ensure 
the necessary arrangements to satisfy this obligations.”  
It means that even though the flag States delegated their duties to the RO, the 
ultimate responsibility for such delegation remains to the flag State. Hence, it 
could be said that developing an appropriate monitoring scheme over RO is a 
necessity for the flag State. The purpose is to confirm that RO performs the 
delegated task in accordance with the assigned authority based on the agreement 
made and that it is also in compliance with international standards. 
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2. RO’s performance determines the flag State’s performance 
Tokyo MoU (2015a), has tabulated the performance of RO, which was 
derived from the number of RO-related deficiencies. In this data, there is a note  
‘RO responsible’ which indicates whether the RO has contributed to those 
deficiencies. The data showed that there is still a variant level of RO’s 
performance (see Table 2-2). This condition was also perceived by the European 
Commission [EC] together with the 27 other  European Countries when they 
submitted a proposal regarding the development of the RO Code. In their 
proposal, they stated that the evidence from different port State control activities 
indicates that a significant number of ships were detained or found with some 
deficiencies soon after being surveyed by the RO (IMO, 2008b). Hence, they 
argued that the monitoring scheme over RO is needed to continuously maintain 
and improve the RO’s performance, which in turn could also improve the flag 
State performance.  
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Table 2-2: Performance of ROs 
 
Source: Tokyo MoU, 2015a, p. 45
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3. Port State Control 
3.1 What is PSC? 
As described in Chapter 1, the PSC inspection record is one aspect used by the 
ICS in determining flag States performance. This section provides the discussion on 
the explanation of PSC. In addition, for a more comprehensive discussion, a review 
of the existing PSC regime is covered as well. The review focuses on the following 
aspects: (i) the relevant instruments used as a basis for PSC activities; (ii) the 
selection of ships to be inspected; (iii) deficiencies and detention; and (iv) the 
concept of a black, grey and white-list.  
IMO describes PSC as: 
“the inspection of foreign ships in national ports to verify that the 
condition of the ship and its equipment comply with the requirements of 
international regulations and that the ship is manned and operated in 
compliance with these rules.” 11 
In fact, the contemporary PSC regime is originated from the “control” 
provisions emanated in some relevant Conventions, for instance, SOLAS and 
MARPOL.12 As such, those Conventions provide a legal basis for the port States to 
undertake the inspection of the foreign vessels visiting their port. Furthermore, as the 
follow-up to that provision, the first regional agreement was concluded and signed in 
                                                          
11 See: http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/MSAS/Pages/PortStateControl.aspx 
12 The following Conventions are the legal basis of “control” provisions: SOLAS: Chapter I 
Regulation 19, Chapter IX Regulation 6, Chapter XI-1 Regulation 4, Chapter XI-2 Regulation 9; 
ICLL: Article 21; MARPOL: Article 5, Article 6, Annex I Regulation 11, Annex II Regulation 16, 
Annex III Regulation 8, Annex IV Regulation 13, Annex V Regulation 8, Annex VI Regulation 10; 
STCW: Article X, Regulation I/4; Tonnage Convention: Article 12; ILO Convention No. 147: Article 
4; and MLC: Article V. 
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the Hague in 1978 (Kasoulides as cited in Cariou, P. et al., 2007, p. 1) shortly 
followed by the Paris MoU in 1982 setting common regional standards for ship 
inspection procedures and detention criteria.  
In implementing this Memorandum, the port State officers will carry out the 
inspections, which consists of  a visit onboard the ship to verify the following: a) the 
validity of the relevant certificates and other documents, b) the overall condition of 
the ship, and c) the compliance of equipment and crew with the above relevant 
instruments. In addition, such inspection should be carried out according to the PSC 
Procedures (IMO, 2011a).  
3.2 PSC regime in the Asia –Pacific region 
The PSC regime applied in the Asia-Pacific region is the Tokyo MoU, which 
was formed in Tokyo on 1 December 1993. By 2016, it has 20 full member 
Authorities consisting of Australia, Canada, Chile, China, Fiji, Hong Kong (China), 
Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, the Marshall Islands, New 
Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Peru, the Philippines, Russian Federation, Singapore, 
Thailand, Vanuatu and Viet Nam. In addition, the Tokyo MoU also has one co-
operating member Authority, which is Panama.13 Indonesia signed the Memorandum 
on 1 April 1996.  
This Memorandum used the following instruments as the basis of PSC 
activities: 
 ICLL 66, including 1988 Protocol 
 SOLAS 74, including 1878 and 1988 Protocols 
 MARPOL 73/78 
 STCW 78 
 Collision Regulation 1972  
                                                          
13 According to the organizational structure of the Tokyo MoU. Retrieved on 17 August 2016 from 
http://www.tokyo-mou.org/organization/organizational_structure.php 
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 Tonnage Measurement 1969 
 ILO Convention No. 147 
 MLC 2006 
 AFS 2001 
 CLC/Fund 92 
3.2.1. Selection of ships for inspection 
In selecting the ships to be inspected, a ship targeting system was initially used 
(Tokyo MoU, 2004).14 This initial system used several elements to calculate the 
target factor value [TFV] of the ship. The TFV value is determined by several 
factors, for instance, ship age, ship flag and classification society. Each TFV 
corresponds to a certain point value (see Table 3-1). The sum of total points of TFV 
will, therefore, determine the target factor of the ship by converting it into the 
priority level. The higher value of TFV means the higher priority of the ships to be 
targeted for the inspection (see Table 3-2).  
On 1 January 2014, the Tokyo MoU introduced the new inspection regime 
[NIR] which used ship risk profile [SRP] in determining the targeted ship (see Table 
3-3). Related to the use of Table 3-3, the Tokyo MoU published lists of flags and 
ROs meeting the criteria of low-risk ships, annually.15 Hence, flags on the Tokyo 
MoU white-list that have completed the IMO Member State Audit Scheme [IMSAS] 
are requested to notify the Secretariat in order to be properly recognized in the NIR 
calculation. 
In addition, the definition of Company in this particular case is similar to the 
Company as defined in the ISM Code. Its performance takes into account the 
detention and deficiency history of all ships, which is counted daily by the Tokyo 
                                                          
14 This system was adopted by Tokyo MoU Committee at its 12th meeting in Chile on March 2003. 
15 Flags who’s total number of inspections over a 3 years period does not reach the minimum 30 are 
not included in the list. ROs who’s total number of inspections over a 3 years period does not reach 
the minimum 60 are not included in the list. 
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MoU on the basis of a running 36-month period (see Tabel 3-4 & 3-5). Accordingly, 
a Company with no inspections in the last 36 months will be given a “medium 
performance”. 
 
Table 3-1: Calculation of Target Factor Value [TFV] 
 
Source: Tokyo MoU (2004) 
 
Table 3-2: Calculation of priority level 
 
Source: Tokyo MoU (2004) 
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Table 3-3: Calculation of ship risk profile 
 
Source: Tokyo MoU (2014) 
Table 3-4: Calculation of deficiency and detention index 
 
 
Source: Tokyo MoU (2016a) 
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Table 3-5: Company performance matrix 
 
Source: Tokyo MoU (2016a) 
As a result, by inputting all the above parameters into Table 3-3, the SRP of the 
ship will be obtained. Furthermore, based on the obtained SRP, the frequency and 
priority of inspections are determined (see Figure 3-1): 
i. Priority I: ships must be inspected because a time window has closed. 
ii. Priority II: ships may be inspected because they are within a time window of 
inspection. 
 
Figure 3-1: Inspection window 
Source: Tokyo MoU (2016a) 
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Additionally, there is also a provision on the “overriding priority” which might 
trigger an inspection outside the above illustrated periodic inspections.17  
3.2.2. Deficiencies and detention 
Following the PSC inspection, if a deficiency is found and such deficiency 
poses a hazard to the safety, the Authority will ensure that the hazard is removed 
before the ship is allowed to proceed to sea, which may include the “detention” of 
the ship (IMO, 2011b). The deficiencies that caused the detention of the ship are so-
called “detainable deficiencies.” In fact, the concept of ship detention to foreign 
ships is not a novelty in maritime history. It was introduced imprimis in the United 
Kingdom through Merchant Shipping Act 1876, where a provision of ship detention 
existed in the case of overloading (Mansell, 2009b, p. 1).18 
                                                          
17 Regardless of the NIR, the following ships will be considered to have overriding priority for 
inspection: 
1. ships which have been subject of report or notification by another Authority; 
2. ships which have been the subject of a report or complaint by the master, a crew member, or 
any other person or organization with a legitimate interest in the safe operation of the ship, 
shipboard living and working conditions or the prevention of the pollution, unless the 
Authority concerned deems the report or complaint to be manifestly unfounded; 
3. ships which have been permitted to leave the port of a State, the Authority of which is a 
signatory to the Memorandum, on the condition that the deficiencies noted must be rectified 
within a specified period, upon expiry of such period; 
4. ships which have been reported by pilots or port authorities as having deficiencies which may 
prejudice their safe navigation; 
5. ships carrying dangerous or polluting goods, which have failed to report all relevant 
information concerning the ships’ particulars, the ships movements and concerning the 
dangerous or polluting goods being carried to the competent authority of the port and coastal 
State; 
6. ships proceed to sea without complying with PSC inspection; and 
7. category of ships identified by the Committee from time to time as warranting priority 
inspections. 
18 Merchant Shipping Act 1876: A foreign ship (which) has taken on board all or any part of her cargo 
at a port in the United Kingdom, and is whilst at that port unsafe by reason of overloading or improper 
loading the provisions of this Part with respect to detention of ships shall apply to that foreign ship as 
if she were a British ship.’ 
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IMO (2011b) grouped the deficiencies found during the inspections into 
several areas according to the aforementioned relevant instruments, for instance, 
deficiencies under the group of SOLAS, ICLL and MARPOL. In particular, with 
respect to the nature of deficiencies, Tokyo MoU provides a deficiency code that 
contains a list of a specific codes/numbers associated with the categories of each 
deficiency. For instance, according to the Tokyo MoU (2015b), a deficiency related 
to the ISM documentation is coded by 15110 and deficiencies related to the 
ventilators and air pipes are coded by 03108.  
In the case of ship detention, the Authority is required to notify the flag State 
immediately by sending the report or writing notification. IMO required that such 
reports should be sent to the National Contact Points [NCP] for PSC matters as 
outlined in the MSC-MEPC.6/Circ.14 (IMO, 2015c). Further, if such detention is 
related to the RO, such RO should also be notified as appropriate. According to the 
information in GISIS, the NCP for Indonesia (as a flag State for PSC matters) is the 
Directorate of Shipping and Seafarers (in Indonesia, called as Ditkappel). 19 
3.2.3. Criteria for attributing deficiencies to the RO 
An RO-related deficiency means the RO that carried out the relevant survey or 
that issued certification had a responsibility in relation with the deficiencies that led 
to the ship detention. According to the Tokyo MoU (2016b), the RO is responsible 
for a deficiency only if the following criteria are met (see Table 3-6):  
i. The deficiency covers a statutory certificate that has been issued or endorsed 
by the RO with a date of survey; and  
ii. The RO has carried out the last survey or verification audit for the relevant 
certificate(s). 
                                                          
19 Detail information of NCP for another contact types also available in GISIS module, see 
https://gisis.imo.org/Public/CP/Browse.aspx?List=SICI&Authority=IDN 
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Also, according to the Tokyo MoU (2016b), there are several conditions that 
should be considered when deciding whether the RO was responsible for such 
deficiencies (see Appendix A). 20 
Table 3-6: Attribution of RO responsibility 
 
Source: Tokyo MoU (2016b) 
3.3 The concept of black-list, grey-list and white-list 
The Tokyo MoU used a specific formula in assessing flag state performance 
based on the statistical data collected every three year period (Tokyo MoU, 2015a). 
                                                          
20 A detainable deficiency is associated with the RO if it is: 
i. a serious structural deficiency including corrosion, wastage, cracking and buckling, unless it 
is clear that the deficiency has occurred since the last survey conducted by the RO; or 
ii. a serious deficiency in equipment or non-structural fittings (such as fire main, air pipes, cargo 
hatches, etc.) AND it is less than 90 days since the last survey conducted by the RO, unless it 
is clear that the deficiency has occurred since the last survey conducted by the RO; or 
iii. a serious deficiency in equipment or non-structural fittings which clearly would have existed 
at the time of the last survey; or 
iv. a serious deficiency associated with out-of-date equipment which was out-of-date at the time 
of the last survey; or 
v. a missing approval or endorsement of Plans and Manuals which clearly would have existed at 
the time of the last survey; or 
vi. a major non-conformity where there is clear evidence of a lack of effective and systematic 
implementation of the ISM Code AND it existed at the last audit conducted by the RO 
provided that the audit took place within the last 90 days; 
vii. a detainable MLC-deficiency where there is clear evidence of a lack of implementation of a 
requirement of the MLC with respect to the accommodation and recreation facilities detailed 
in Regulation 3.1 in Title 3 and that it existed at the last inspection conducted by the RO. 
  A detainable deficiency is not associated with the RO if it is: 
i. the result of accidental or voyage damage; 
ii. missing equipment that is likely to have been stolen; or 
iii. an expired certificate unless the certificate was improperly issued by the RO. 
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Such formula sets the limits which are the “black-to-grey” and “grey-to-white” (see 
Figure 3-2).  
 
Note: N = number of inspections 
  p = allowable detention limit “yardstick” (set to 7 %) 
  z = significance requested (z = 1.645) 
  u = allowed number of detention for the black or white list 
Figure 3-2: Formula to determine “u” factor 
Source: Tokyo MoU (2015a) 
The flag State who’s total number of detentions fall above “u black-to-grey”, 
means that its performance is worse than the average (black list). On the contrary, if 
the total number of detentions fall below “u white-to-grey”, it means that its 
performance is better than the average (white list). If the total number of detentions 
fall between “u black-to-grey” and “u white-to-grey”, it means that its performance is on 
the grey list. However, this formula is only applicable for the flag State where its 
ships were involved in 30 or more PSC inspections over a three-year period. 
In order to make the flag State performance comparable, the Tokyo MoU 
introduced the excess factor [ef], which shows the indication of the number of times 
the yardstick “p” has to be altered and recalculated. The size of the increment and 
decrement “q” is set at 3 %. According to the Tokyo MoU (2014, p. 56), “ef” is 
calculated by the following formula: 
 
Hence, to determine the new value for “p”, “q” has to multiply with “ef” 
value. The outcome has to be added to the normal value for “p”. The new “p” value 
is then used to calculate the new “u”  limit by using the above principles. 
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4. Analysis of Indonesia’s Performance 
A broad explanation concerning the flag States’ duties and responsibilities as 
well as the aspect of delegation authority has been presented in Chapter 2. In 
addition, the rational of PSC and its related aspects have also been discussed 
comprehensively in Chapter 3.  
Specifically, this session discusses the analysis of the performance of the 
Indonesian flag by taking into account all aspects and indicators discussed in the 
previous Chapters. 
4.1 Ratification of international maritime treaties 
The first aspect to take into consideration is the ratification of the international 
maritime conventions. In particular, the analysis focused on the seven main 
Conventions as described in Chapter 1.1. The analysis is performed by examining the 
ratification process for each Convention first and then linking them with the 
information outlined in the document of depository instruments which has been 
collated by the IMO (IMO, 2016).  
 As already described in Chapter 2.2.1.1, there are two mechanisms applied by 
States in ratifying the international treaties, which are a monistic and dualistic 
concept. In the case of Indonesia, it is the dualistic theory that is reflected in the 
actual practice. Since, as stipulated under Article 2 of the Constitution of the 
Republic of Indonesia Number 24 (2000), ratification of international treaties into 
national legislation should be consulted and approved by the parliament in advance 
before it becomes binding and give effect.  
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1) SOLAS 74 including 1988 Protocol 
SOLAS 74 was adopted on 1 November 1974 and entered into force on 25 
May 1980. Indonesia was a signatory party to this Convention and has ratified this 
Convention through the enactment of President Decree no. 65/1980 on 9 December 
1980 (Ministry of the State Secretariat [MoS], 1980). Furthermore, Indonesia has 
deposited the Instrument to the IMO on 17 February 1981. Worldwide, the 
Convention has been ratified by 162 States/Parties comprising of 98.53 % of the 
gross tonnage of the world’s merchant fleet. 
Furthermore, the 1988 Protocol of SOLAS Convention was adopted on 11 
November 1988 and entered into force on 3 February 2000. This Protocol has been 
ratified by 109 States/Parties comprising of 95.35 % of the world tonnage. However, 
Indonesia was neither a signatory party nor ratified the Convention. 
2) STCW 78 including 2010 amendments 
This Convention was adopted on 7 July 1978 and entered into force on 28 
April 1984. Indonesia was a signatory party to this Convention and has ratified this 
Convention through the enactment of President Decree no. 60/1986 on 4 December 
1986 (MoS, 1986a). Furthermore, Indonesia has deposited the Instrument to the IMO 
on 27 January 1987. This Convention has been ratified by 161 States/Parties 
comprising of 98.76 % of the gross tonnage of the world’s merchant fleet. 
Concerning the 2010 amendment, the so-called “Manila Amendment,” 
Indonesia was one of the parties that participated in the Conference which was held 
in Manila, the Philippines from 21 to 25 June 2010.  Indonesia was deemed as having 
accepted the amendment since Indonesia had not sent the notification for the 
objection to the amendment. 
Under Article VII of the STCW Convention, a transitional period of a 
maximum of five years was put into place. Since the Manila amendments entered 
into force on 1 January 2012, they will be fully operational on 1 January 2017. 
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3) MARPOL 73/78 Annexes I – II 
The MARPOL 73/78 Convention was adopted on 17 February 1978 and 
entered into force on 2 October 1983. Indonesia ratified this Convention through the 
enactment of President Decree no. 46/1986 on 9 September 1986 (MoS, 1986b). 
However, Indonesia deposited the Instrument on 21 October 1986 with the 
declaration of exception to the Annexes III, IV and V. 21 This Convention has been 
ratified by 154 States/Parties comprising 98.73 % of the gross tonnage of the world’s 
merchant fleet. 
4) MARPOL 73/78 Annexes III – VI 
In accordance with Article 14(1) of the Convention, a State/Party may declare 
that it does not accept any one or all of Annexes III to VI. That is the reason why 
these annexes are so-called the “Optional Annexes.” As mentioned before (in the 
point 3), when Indonesia deposited the Instrument of Accession MARPOL 73/78, it 
declared the non-acceptance of the provisions of the Annexes III, IV and V. Also, it 
was mentioned under Article 14(2) of the MARPOL 73/78, a State/Party which has 
declared not being bound by the Optional Annexes, may at any time accept such 
Annexes by depositing the instrument at the IMO. Therefore, each of these Optional 
Annexes might enter into force on a different date.  
In the case of Indonesia, these Optional Annexes were ratified simultaneously 
through the enactment of President Decree no. 29/2012 on 20 March 2012 (Ministry 
                                                          
21 According to IMO (2016, p. 127), the instrument of accession of the Republic of Indonesia 
contained the following declarations (in the English language):  
(i) In accordance with the provisions of article 14(1) of the International Convention for the 
Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, the Government of the Republic of Indonesia declares 
that it does not accept all provisions of Annexes III, IV and V of the present Convention.  
(ii) The Government of the Republic of Indonesia understands the words 'international law‘ in 
regulation 1(9) of Annex I of MARPOL 73/78 on the Regulations for the Prevention of Pollution 
by Oil to mean the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea." 
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of Justice and Human Rights [MoJ], 2012). Moreover, Indonesia deposited the 
Instrument to the IMO on 24 August 2012. 
(i) MARPOL Annex III 
This Annex entered into force on 1 July 1992. This Convention has been ratified 
by 146 States/Parties comprising of 98.15 % of the gross tonnage of the world’s 
merchant fleet. 
(ii) MARPOL Annex IV 
This Annex entered into force on 27 September 2003. This Convention has been 
ratified by 138 States/Parties comprising of 90.96 % of the gross tonnage of the 
world’s merchant fleet. 
(iii) MARPOL Annex V 
This Annex entered into force on 31 December 1988. This Convention has been 
ratified by 151 States/Parties comprising of 98.32 % of the gross tonnage of the 
world’s merchant fleet. 
(iv) MARPOL Annex VI 
This Annex entered into force on 19 May 2005. This Convention has been 
ratified by 87 States/Parties comprising of 95.69 % of the gross tonnage of the 
world’s merchant fleet. 
5) ICLL 66 including 1988 Protocol 
The ICLL 66 Convention was adopted on 5 April 1966 and entered into force 
on 21 July 1968. Indonesia ratified this Convention through the enactment of 
President Decree no. 47/1976 on 2 November 1976 (MoS, 1976). Furthermore, 
Indonesia deposited the Instrument at the IMO on 17 January 1977. This Convention 
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has been ratified by 161 States/Parties comprising of 98.52 % of the gross tonnage of 
the world’s merchant fleet. 
Furthermore, the 1988 Protocol of Load Line Convention was adopted on 11 
November 1988 and entered into force on 3 February 2000. This Protocol has been 
ratified by 103 States/Parties comprising of 95.28 % of the world tonnage. However, 
Indonesia was neither a signatory party nor did it ratify the Convention. 
6) MLC 2006 
This Convention was adopted on 23 February 2006 and entered into force on 
20 August 2013. According to the ILO website, by July 2016, MLC 2006 has been 
ratified by 79 member States representing over 80 % of the world’s global shipping 
tonnage. Algeria is the latest member State which ratified the Convention on 22 July 
2016. For the ratifying States, it means that all commercial ships of 500 GT or above, 
flying their flag and sailing on international voyages, will need to carry a Maritime 
Labour Certificate and Declaration of Maritime Labour Compliance [DMLC]. It 
should also be noted that these two documents are subject to PSC inspection. To 
facilitate the inspection process, the ILO (2008), provides the guidelines which can 
be used by the PSC officers when carrying out the inspections under MLC 2006. 
Indonesia has not yet ratified this Convention. However, as already mentioned 
in Chapter 2.2.2, the rule of “no more favorable treatment” that existed in this 
Convention would apply accordingly. This means that every ship would be subject 
to the same level of inspection with respect to the working and living conditions for 
the seafarers onboard. Hence, in fact, these conditions are putting Indonesia in a 
disadvantageous position. Although the MLC has not yet been ratified, Indonesian 
flagged vessels serving the international trade, will receive similar treatment as any 
ships of a State that has already ratified the Convention. 
7) CLC/FUND 92 
CLC/FUND 92 Convention consists of two different Conventions, which are: 
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(i) International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage 1969 [CLC 
69], including 1992 Protocol [CLC 92] 
The CLC 69 Convention was adopted on 29 November 1969 and entered into 
force on 19 June 1975. Indonesia was a signatory party to this Convention and 
ratified this Convention through the enactment of President Decree no. 18/1978 
on 2 November 1976 (MoS, 1978a). Furthermore, Indonesia deposited the 
Instrument at the IMO on 1 September 1978. This Convention has been ratified 
by only 34 States/Parties comprising of 2.74 % of the gross tonnage of the 
world’s merchant fleet.  
Furthermore, the Protocol 1992 of CLC Convention [CLC 92] was adopted on 27 
November 1992 and entered into force on 30 May 1996. This Protocol has been 
ratified by 136 States/Parties comprising of 97.00 % of the world tonnage. 
Indonesia also ratified this Convention through the enactment of President 
Decree no. 52/1999 on 28 May 1999 (MoS, 1999). Furthermore, Indonesia 
deposited the Instrument to the IMO on 6 July 1999.  
(ii) International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for  
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage 1971 [FUND 71], including 1992 
Protocol [FUND 92] 
This Convention was adopted on 18 December 1971 and entered into force on 16 
October 1978. Indonesia was a signatory party to this Convention and ratified 
this Convention through the enactment of President Decree no. 19/1978 on 1 July 
1978 (MoS, 1978b). Furthermore, Indonesia deposited the Instrument on 1 
September 1978, coinciding with the deposition of the CLC 69.  
However, on 26 June 1998, Indonesia submitted the document of denunciation to 
this Convention, which means that Indonesia no longer ratified the Convention. 
In fact, there were several States which also denounced this Convention, leading 
the member States of this Convention to fall to only 24 States. As a consequence, 
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according to the IMO (2016, p. 270), this Convention ceased to be in force on 24 
May 2002.  
Subsequently, 1992 Protocol of FUND Convention [FUND 92] was adopted on 
27 November 1992 and entered into force on 30 May 1996. This Protocol has 
been ratified by 114 States/Parties comprising of 94.04 % of the world tonnage. 
However, Indonesia is neither a signatory party nor has ratified this Convention.  
8) 1988 Protocol of SOLAS and Load Line Convention 
These Protocols were adopted by the International Conference on the 
Harmonized System of Survey and Certification [HSSC], which was held in London 
from 31 October to 11 November 1988. The main outcome of this Conference was 
the adoption of Protocol 1998 to SOLAS and the Load Line Convention which 
introduced the HSSC. Since these two Protocols entered into force on 3 February 
2000, the HSSC would also be applied from that date accordingly.  
Regarding the implementation of the harmonized system, flag States should 
refer to the global and uniform implementation of the HSSC as described in the 
Resolution A.883(21) (IMO, 2000a). In addition, concerning the surveys that have to 
be performed and the certificates that have to be issued, flag States should refer to 
the survey guidelines under the HSSC as set out under the Resolution A.1053(27) 
(IMO, 2011b). In brief, IMO has provided the diagrammatic survey arrangement in 
accordance with the provisions of the HSSC (see Appendix B).  
As similar to the description in Chapter 2.2.2, these two Protocols also contain 
the provision of “no more favorable treatment”. This clause was contained in the 
Article I of the Protocols. The HSSC which was introduced under these Protocols 
covers the following provisions: 
 1988 SOLAS Protocol Chapter I:  
 Part A (definitions): Regulation 2 
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 Part B (surveys and certificates): Regulations 6 to 16 and Regulation 19 
 1988 Load Line Protocol Annex A : Articles 13, 14, 16, 17, 18 and 19 
4.2 Delegation authority complying with Resolution A.739(18) 
This section specifically analyzes the aspect of delegation authority. According 
to the ICS (2015), the following indicators were used when considering a flag State 
as a good performance flag: 
(i) Flag States that authorized an RO which is an IACS members or, flag States 
that authorized not more than six ROs that are not IACS members 22 
(ii) Flag States that submitted the report concerning the authorization to the IMO 
4.2.1. Authorization to RO (IACS vs. non-IACS) 
Considering the fact that the recognition of classification societies which are 
not a member of IACS does not mean that the flag is in any way deficient (ICS, 
2015), the ICS noted that some ROs,  not a member of IACS,  also fully meet the 
standards required by the IMO. Nevertheless, ICS (2015) also viewed that if a flag 
State recognizes large numbers of ROs that are not a member IACS, there might be a 
reason to doubt whether all of these ROs comply with the IMO requirements. On the 
other hand, ICS assumes that classification societies which are members of IACS 
naturally comply with the RO Code. Obviously, that was the reason why the 
recognition of IACS members was labelled as a positive indicator.  
As described in Chapter 2.1, Indonesia as a flag State discharged its duties and 
responsibilities through the Maritime Administration namely DGST. In addition, 
DGST had authorized one RO, which is BKI. Indeed, such authorization to BKI was 
based on the stipulation of a decision of the Director of Sea Transportation no. 
PK.204/1/3/DJPL-16 dated 21 April 2016.  
                                                          
22 IACS members: ABS, BV, CCS, CRS, DnV-GL, IRS, KR, LR, NK, PRS, RINA and RS. 
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Subsequently, the analysis of the detention lists showed that BKI was not the 
only one organization recognized by DGST. The analysis revealed that from 2012 to 
2015, at least nine ROs were discovered, which are: ABS, BRS, BV, DnV, GL, 
DnV-GL,23 NK, LR and RINA (see Figure 4-1). All of them were IACS members, 
except BKI and BRS. As such, these facts confirmed the good performance of 
Indonesia in complying with the first indicator, as described in Chapter 4.2. 
 
Figure 4-1: Lists of ROs authorized on behalf of Indonesia (2012 - 2015) 
4.2.2. Reporting requirement related to flag State authorization to RO 
In order to comply with this requirement, the flag State is obliged to inform the 
IMO about the report concerning the responsibilities and conditions for authorization 
through GISIS system.  
                                                          
23 DnV-GL is a merger group company between DnV and GL and became operational since 12 
September 2013. See https://www.dnvgl.com/about/in-brief/our-history.html 
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Meanwhile, the information provided in the GISIS was considered out of dated 
since not all States had updated their detailed information there (Mansell, 2009a, p. 
113). Also, Indonesia belongs to those who did not notify IMO since other ROs had 
been performing surveys and audits, and also issuing the statutory certificates on 
behalf of Indonesian. The information obtained directly from ships during PSC 
inspection revealed the existence of other ROs besides BKI. This information was 
evidenced by the record of ship’s detention published by the Tokyo MoU annually. 
However, on 5 August 2016, Indonesia updated the information in the GISIS list of 
RO-related information. It is shown that Indonesia assigned the authorization to the 
only one RO, which is BKI.24 As such, these facts also confirmed the good 
performance of Indonesia in complying with the second indicator as described in 
Chapter 4.2. 
4.3 Mandatory reporting requirement to the IMO and ILO 
4.3.1. Reporting requirement under MARPOL 
Under the requirement stipulated in the MEPC/Circ.318, flag States are 
requested to submit their reports to the IMO by 30 September each year. The data 
collected from this report is useful to assess the effectiveness of MARPOL 
implementation and also for the statistical purposes. The IMO carried out the 
analysis and evaluation with respect to this report for the period of  5 years during 
2008 to 2012.25 The analysis concluded that the rate of reporting was still low, with 
an average of  25.5 % (IMO, 2014b). As seen in Figure 4-2, the highest reporting rate 
took place in 2009 with the value of 26.7 %.  
IMO also collated the States/Parties that had submitted the required reports and 
listed them in the Annex. In addition, the Annex also indicates whether such States 
had submitted the report within the reporting interval as stated before (by 30 
                                                          
24 See https://gisis.imo.org/Public/RO/BrowseCountry.aspx?Country=IDN 
25 Data for the period of 2012 onwards were not available 
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September each year). In the case of Indonesia, as seen in Figure 4-3, there were not 
any reports submitted to the IMO during that period. 
 
Figure 4-2: The rate of reporting by flag States 
Source: IMO (2014b, p. 4) 
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Figure 4-3: Status of reporting under MARPOL from 2008 to 2012 (as of 23 June 2014) 
Source: IMO (2014b, Annex 2, p. 3) 
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4.3.2. Reporting requirement regarding casualty investigation  
As mentioned in Chapter 2.2.1.2, a casualty investigation should be performed 
in accordance with the Casualty Investigation Code (IMO, 2008a). Chapter 14 of this 
Code deals with the provision concerning the reporting requirement of the casualty 
investigation report. It is required that such report should be made comprehensively 
based on the objective evidence found during the investigation process to be further 
analyzed by IMO. The information related to marine casualties and incidents as well 
as safety investigation reports, which have been submitted to the IMO, were 
available in the GISIS casualty module.  
Apart from the importance of investigation reports, there is another important 
aspect concerning the safety investigation, which is the independence and the 
objectivity of the investigators. It should be ensured that the investigators performing 
marine casualty investigations should be impartial and objective. In other words, to 
collect credible findings and acceptable recommendations, the investigators should 
be free from external influences. Also, they should not conduct the investigation with 
a potential conflict of interest.  
In fact, there are several discussions concerning the issue of conflict of interest. 
One of them was highlighted by Reason as cited in Ghirxi (2003, p. 44) who 
considered the conflict of interest as a threat to safety. He had pointed out that: 
“…the investigation is inevitably constrained by the inter organizational 
relations existing between the regulatory body and the regulated company. 
These, in turn, lead to relationships based more upon bargaining and 
compromise than threats and sanctions.” 
Therefore, it could be a possibility if the Maritime Administration -as the 
regulator- conducts the casualty investigation, a conflict of interest might exist. Since 
the Administration might have a relationship with the entities being investigated 
(shipowners and RO), this could prevent its independence and objectivity. Reason’s 
principle mentioned above, was adopted by most of flag States when forming the 
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structure of their investigating body, including Indonesia. That was the reason 
casualty investigations in Indonesia are conducted by a specific institution which is 
independent and also separated from the Maritime Administration. This institution is 
called [KNKT] ‘Komite Nasional Keselamatan Transportasi’ (National 
Transportation Safety Committee). This committee was established on 1 September 
1999 under the enactment of President Decree no. 105/1999 (MoS, 1999b). Although 
KNKT is under the responsible of the Ministry of Transport, the Minister has no 
vested power to interfere with the output of the investigation. 
Concerning the investigation reports that have been submitted by the flag 
States, the IMO has carried out the analysis regularly. During 1 January 2010 to 31 
March 2015, there were 776 accidents which were grouped as very serious 
casualties, of which 366 accidents were provided with the investigation reports 
which resulted in a reporting rate of 47.16 % (IMO, 2015d). In the case of Indonesia, 
during the same period (1 January 2010 to 31 March 2015), a total of 33 very serious 
casualties were recorded. However, only four investigation reports were submitted to 
the IMO corresponding to the reporting rate of 12.12 %, which is still below the 
global reporting rate. 
With respect to the above condition (the low reporting rate), it is important to 
recognize that the success of the casualty investigation is determined by the 
investigator’s skill. Such skills covered both technical and non-technical (soft skills) 
matters such as skill in collecting evidence and writing a report. Probably, this was 
the reason for the IMO under the III Code which required the States to develop and 
implement the control and monitoring program and ensure that their investigators are 
trained accordingly. 
Concerning the investigator’s qualification and knowledge, it is emphasized 
that the investigators should have the proper qualification and sufficient knowledge 
related to the accidents and casualties being investigated. This qualification might be 
related to the experience, such as a certain period of time, a professional with a 
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maritime background (e.g. ship’s officer, marine engineer, naval architect) possesses 
(IMO, 2013a). The motivation is that the knowledge and skills of the investigators, 
including their experience in managing the investigation tasks effectively, can 
substantially determine the success of the investigation which includes completing 
the investigation reports. 
4.3.3. Mandatory reporting requirement under the STCW Convention 
As discussed in Chapter 2.2.1.2.1, States are required to communicate the 
report concerning the compliance with the STCW Convention to the IMO Secretary-
General, who will further analyze such report with the assistance of the approved 
competent persons. According to the IMO (2015b, p.17), as of 20 July 2015, Dr. 
Takeshi Nakazawa (Professor of the World Maritime University, Malmö, Sweden) is 
the approved competent person for Indonesia, which also covers the area of Japan, 
the Philippines, and Viet Nam.  
With respect to the report submitted by the Secretary-General to the MSC, 
there is a term the so-called “STCW white list” that is used to identify the States that 
have demonstrated the full and complete effect to the provisions of the STCW 95 
Convention. The ICS used this term (STCW white list) as an indicator when 
assessing flag States’ performance. The assessment was performed based on the list 
published by the IMO through the MSC Circular which has been updated from time 
to time.  
In fact, the so-called “white list” initially appeared at the IMO-MSC meeting 
during its seventy-second session, which was held on 17 to 26 May 2000 (IMO, 
2000b, p.7). As a follow-up to the previous meeting, MSC at its seventy-third session 
(27 November to 6 December 2000) concluded to publish MSC/Circ 978 which 
contained the list of States considered as the initial “STCW white list” countries 
(IMO, 2000c). The last updated STCW white list Parties/States was contained in the 
MSC.1/Circ.1163/Rev.9, which was issued on 15 June 2015 (IMO, 2015e).  As 
evidenced in the prescribed MSC Circulars, which were regularly revised, Indonesia 
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has been included in that list since the initial publication in 2000 and has maintained 
it consistently until 2015. Hence, based on this reason, the ICS recognized Indonesia 
as a good performance State. 
4.3.4. Mandatory reporting requirement to the ILO 
The analysis on this aspect was carried out according to the Report of the 
Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations 
during 2012 to 2015. 
1. Analysis for the period year 2012 
The analysis showed that, a total of 2,393 reports were requested to be submitted 
to the ILO office and 1,664 reports had been received (ILO, 2013, p.16). This 
figure corresponds to the global reporting rate of 69.53 %. In the case of 
Indonesia, there were eight reports requested and all of them have been received 
by the ILO, giving the reporting rate of 100 % (ILO, 2013, p.866). 
2. Analysis for the period year 2013 
The analysis showed that, a total of 2,319 reports were requested to be submitted 
to the ILO office and 1,719 reports had been received (ILO, 2014, p.14). This 
figure corresponds to the global reporting rate of 74.12 %. In the case of 
Indonesia, there were three reports requested and all of them have been received 
by the ILO, giving the reporting rate of 100 % (ILO, 2014, p.594). 
3. Analysis for the period year 2014 
The analysis showed that, a total of 2,383 reports were requested to be submitted 
to the ILO office and 1,709 reports had been received (ILO, 2015, p.13). This 
figure corresponds to the global reporting rate of 71.71 %. In the case of 
Indonesia, there were six reports requested, five of which have been received by 
the ILO. There was one report which was not received by the ILO. These figures 
correspond to the reporting rate of 83.3 % (ILO, 2015, p.521). 
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4. Analysis for the period year 2015 
The analysis showed that a total of 2,336 reports were requested to be submitted 
to the ILO office and 1,628 reports were received (ILO, 2016, p.11). This figure 
corresponds to the global reporting rate of 69.7 %. In the case of Indonesia, there 
were nine reports requested and all of them have been received by the ILO, 
giving the reporting rate of 100 % (ILO, 2016, p.568). 
It was noticeably from the above analysis that during 2012 to 2015, Indonesia 
fulfilled the reporting requirement to the ILO. 
4.4 Record of PSC inspection 
This section provides the analysis of the Indonesian flagged vessels that have 
been detained as a result of PSC inspection in the Tokyo MoU region. The analysis 
was performed based on the records of ship detention for the period of 2012 to 2015.  
4.4.1. Analysis of the ship detention list 
The analysis in this part covers the detention list for the period of 2012 to 2015. 
The analysis was carried out for each year and compared to the regional figures in 
the Tokyo MoU region. 
1. Detention list of the year 2012 
According to the Tokyo MoU (2012, p.12), a total of 30,929 inspections were 
carried out in 2012, of which 19,250 inspections corresponds to 62.24 %  were found 
with deficiencies. Regarding the ship detention, a total of 1,421 ships were detained 
corresponds to the detention rate of 4.59 %. 
In the case of Indonesia, a total of 179 inspections were carried out, of which 
164 were found with deficiencies. It means that in 91.62 % of the inspections 
deficiencies were found. Among those ships, 31 were detained, giving a detention 
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ratio of 17.32 %. This detention rate was considerably higher compared to the 
regional average, which was 4.59 %.  
Recalling the “u” factor formula as described in Chapter 3.3, by including all 
of those facts, Indonesia has the “u white-to-grey” factor = 6 and “u black-to-grey” = 19. 
Since the number of detention is 31, Indonesia has been included in the black list 
position with the excess factor of 2.53.  
Concerning the deficiencies found, for the 179 ships inspections, a total of 
1,208 deficiencies were found of which 141 were considered as the so-called 
“detainable deficiencies” as prescribed in Chapter 3.2.2. 
With regard to the categories of deficiencies, the composition of each category 
for Indonesia was slightly different compared to the regional composition. In the 
Tokyo MoU, it was noted that fire safety system, safety of navigation and life-saving 
appliances, were the top three categories discovered on-board with the compositions 
of 20 %, 17 % and 12 % respectively. Differently, for the Indonesian flag the top 
frequent deficiencies fell in the category of fire safety system followed by certificate 
and documentation and life-saving appliances, which accounted for 21 %, 18 % and 
14 % respectively (see Table 4-1 and Figure 4-4).  
In addition, recalling the discussion on the responsible parties for the 
deficiencies discovered on board, the analysis showed that there was only one 
deficiency attributed to the RO, which is BKI. Such deficiency is particularly related 
to the oil filtering equipment which falls into the category of pollution prevention. 
Thus, the RO responsibility for the deficiency corresponds to 0.71 % and the 
remaining of 99.29 % is still attributed to the Administration or the shipowners. 
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Table 4-1: Detainable deficiencies, 2012 
Nature of deficiencies 
2012 
Indonesia Tokyo MoU 
Number % Number % 
Cert. & documentation 25 18 9,388 9 
Fire safety 29 21 20,522 20 
Life-saving appl. 20 14 12,070 12 
ISM related 6 4 3,292 3 
Load lines  9 6 6,753 7 
Radio comm. 10 7 2,987 3 
Safety of nav. 9 6 17,124 17 
Emergency system 10 7 5,628 6 
Pollution prevention 14 10 5,185 5 
Structural cond. 5 4 3,593 4 
Propulsion & Aux. Mach. 1 1 5,470 5 
Alarms 3 2 798 1 
MLC (work & living cond.) 0 0 5,168 5 
Dangerous goods 0 0 241 0 
Cargo operation 0 0 675 1 
Others 0 0 1,436 1 
Total deficiencies 141 100 100,330 100 
 
 
Figure 4-4: Composition of the detainable deficiencies, 2012 
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2. Detention list of the year 2013 
According to the Tokyo MoU (2013, p.13), a total of 31,018 inspections were 
carried out in 2013, of which 18,790 inspections, corresponding to 60.58 %, were 
found with deficiencies. Regarding the detention of ships, a total of 1,395 ships were 
detained, corresponding to the detention rate of 4.50 %.  
In the case of Indonesia, a total of 159 inspections were carried out, of which 
132 were found with deficiencies. It means that 83.02 % of the inspections had found 
deficiencies. Among those inspected ships, 24 of which were detained, gave the 
detention percentage of 15.09 %. This detention rate was considerably higher 
compared to the regional average, which was 4.50 %. By putting all of those facts, 
Indonesia has the “u white-to-grey” factor = 5 and “u black-to-grey” = 17. Since the 
number of detention is 24, Indonesia has been included in the black list position with 
the excess factor of 2.81.  
Concerning the deficiencies found, for the 159 inspections that have been 
performed, a total of 959 deficiencies were found of which 102 were considered as 
detainable deficiencies. Since there was no record of deficiency attributed to the RO, 
this means that the Administration itself or the shipowners were responsible for 100 
% of the deficiencies discovered. 
With regard to the nature of deficiencies, the composition of each category for 
Indonesia was similar with the regional composition. In the Tokyo MoU, it was 
noted that the composition of the top three categories were similar to the 2012 
figures (see Table 4-2 and Figure 4-5). The identical figures also reflected in the case 
of Indonesia, where the top three categories were still the same as in the previous 
year. In addition, the top three categories represented more than 50 % of the total 
number of deficiencies.  
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Table 4-2: Detainable deficiencies, 2013 
Nature of deficiencies 
2013 
Indonesia Tokyo MoU 
Number % Number % 
Cert. & documentation 13 13 8,767 9 
Fire safety 25 25 17,539 18 
Life-saving appl. 13 13 11,507 12 
ISM related 6 6 3,099 3 
Load lines  0 0 5,899 6 
Radio comm. 7 7 2,500 3 
Safety of nav. 7 7 16,275 17 
Emergency system 8 8 5,392 6 
Pollution prevention 6 6 6,715 7 
Structural cond. 7 7 3,511 4 
Propulsion & Aux. Mach. 3 3 5,458 6 
Alarms 4 4 754 1 
MLC (work & living cond.) 0 0 5,816 6 
Dangerous goods 1 1 216 0 
Cargo operation 1 1 575 1 
Others   0 1,240 1 
Total deficiencies 101 100 95,263 100 
 
Figure 4-5: Composition of the detainable deficiencies, 2013 
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3. Detention list of the year 2014 
According to the Tokyo MoU (2014, p.11), a total of 30,405 inspections were 
carried out in 2014, of which 19,029 inspections were found with deficiencies, 
corresponding to 62.59 %. Regarding the detention of ships, a total of 1,203 ships 
were detained corresponding to the detention rate of 3.96 %.  
In the case of Indonesia, a total of 190 inspections were carried out, of which 
176 were found with deficiencies. It means that 92.63 % of the inspections had 
deficiencies. Among those inspected ships, of which 25 were detained, gave the 
detention percentage of 13.16 %. This detention rate was considerably higher 
compared to the regional average, which was 3.96 %.  
For this period, Indonesia recorded the “u white-to-grey” factor = 7 and “u black-
to-grey” = 20. Since the number of detention is 25, Indonesia is considered being in 
the black-list position with the excess factor of 2.89. Furthermore, concerning the 
deficiencies found for the 190 inspections that had been performed, a total of 1,393 
deficiencies were found, 72 of which were considered as detainable deficiencies. 
Since there was no deficiency attributed to the RO, this means that 100 % of 
deficiencies were attributed to the Administration itself or the shipowners.  
With regard to the nature of deficiencies, the composition of categories for 
Indonesia was slightly different compared with the regional composition. In the 
Tokyo MoU, it was noted that the composition of the top three categories was similar 
to the previous year. The fire safety system, safety of navigation and life-saving 
appliances were still found to be the top categories frequently discovered onboard 
(see Table 4-3 and Figure 4-6). Differently, in the case of the Indonesian flag, the top 
three categories were certificate and documentation, ISM-related and pollution 
prevention. Although the total number of deficiencies were lower compared to 2012 
and 2013, the category of certificate and documentation still noted the highest 
percentage, accounting for 18 % of the total deficiencies. 
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Table 4-3: Detainable deficiencies, 2014 
Nature of deficiencies 
2014 
Indonesia Tokyo MoU 
Number % Number % 
Cert. & documentation 12 17 10,395 12 
Fire safety 8 11 16,654 19 
Life-saving appl. 6 8 10,515 12 
ISM related 12 17 2,699 3 
Load lines  2 3 5,812 6 
Radio comm. 3 4 2,259 3 
Safety of nav. 9 13 14,231 16 
Emergency system 3 4 5,093 6 
Pollution prevention 10 14 5,267 6 
Structural cond. 1 1 2,671 3 
Propulsion & Aux. Mach. 2 3 4,549 5 
Alarms 0 0 634 1 
MLC (work & living cond.) 2 3 7,100 8 
Dangerous goods 0 0 183 0 
Cargo operation 0 0 613 1 
Others 2 3 885 1 
Total deficiencies 72 100 89,560 100 
 
Figure 4-6: Composition of the detainable deficiencies, 2014 
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4. Detention list of the year 2015 
According to the Tokyo MoU (2015a, p.11), a total of 31,407 inspections were 
carried out in 2015, of which 19,142 inspections (corresponding to 60.95 %) were 
found with deficiencies. Regarding the detentions, a total of 1,153 ships were 
detained resulting in a detention rate of 3.67 %. 
In the case of Indonesia, a total of 197 inspections were carried out, of which 
163 were found with deficiencies. It means that 82.74 % of the inspections had 
deficiencies. Among those inspected ships, 36 were detained, resulting in a detention 
percentage of 18.27 %. This detention rate was considerably higher compared to the 
regional average, which was 3.67 %. This year Indonesia noted the “u white-to-grey” 
factor = 7 and “u black-to-grey” = 20. Since the number of detention is 36, Indonesia 
has been included in the black list position with the excess factor of 3.03.  
Concerning the deficiencies found, for the 197 inspections that have been 
performed, a total of 1,053 deficiencies were found of which 115 were considered 
detainable deficiencies and two deficiencies attributed to the RO. In this particular 
case, the responsible RO was BKI and the deficiencies found were related to the 
water/weather-tightness conditions of the load line items. It means, the percentage of 
RO responsible deficiency was 1.74 % and the remaining of 98.26 % still attributed 
to the Administration itself or the shipowners. 
With regard to the nature of deficiencies, the composition of categories for 
Indonesia was similar with the regional composition. In the Tokyo MoU, a total of 
83,606 deficiencies were recorded during the inspection in 2015. It was noted that 
the composition of the top three categories was still similar to the previous year. The 
fire safety system, safety of navigation and life-saving appliances were the top 
frequent categories discovered onboard (see Table 4-4 and Figure 4-7). On the other 
hand, the different figures reflected in the case of Indonesia, i.e., the deficiencies in 
the category of certificate and documentation, fire safety system and life-saving 
appliances were the top three categories.  
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Additionally, the increasing number of deficiencies found also coincided with 
the increasing number of the most detainable deficiencies. As seen in Figure 4-7, the 
deficiencies in the category of certificate and documentation accounted for 27 % and 
followed by fire safety system and life-saving appliances with the percentage of 22 
% and 17 % respectively. These three categories deficiencies represented more than 
60 percent of the total deficiencies. 
Table 4-4: Detainable deficiencies, 2015 
Nature of deficiencies 
2015 
Indonesia Tokyo MoU 
Number % Number % 
Cert. & documentation 31 27 8,003 10 
Fire safety 25 22 15,143 18 
Life-saving appl. 20 17 11,213 13 
ISM related 6 5 2,803 3 
Load lines  8 7 5,584 7 
Radio comm. 0 0 2,231 3 
Safety of nav. 5 4 12,619 15 
Emergency system 8 7 5,771 7 
Pollution prevention 6 5 5,067 6 
Structural cond. 2 2 2,422 3 
Propulsion & Aux. Mach. 1 1 4,137 5 
Alarms 0 0 577 1 
MLC (work & living cond.) 2 2 6,462 8 
Dangerous goods 1 1 352 0 
Cargo operation 0 0 500 1 
Others 0 0 722 1 
Total deficiencies 115 100 83,606 100 
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Figure 4-7: Composition of detainable deficiencies, 2015 
4.4.2. Analysis of the most detainable deficiencies 
Following the above discussion, it was noted that there were six main 
categories of deficiencies frequently discovered during the PSC inspection onboard. 
Such categories were: 1) Fire safety system, 2) Safety of navigation, 3) Life-saving 
appliances, 4) Certificate and documentation, 5) ISM related and 6) Pollution 
prevention (see Figure 4-8 and 4-9).  
As seen in Figure 4-9, the Tokyo MoU figures show the consistent pattern in 
general. Conversely, for the case of Indonesia, each of these categories shows the 
individual fluctuation pattern.  Also, since the proportion of each category during 
2012 to 2015 fluctuated, the general trend of the deficiencies could not be simply 
drawn. This condition was a contradiction if compared to the regional Tokyo MoU 
pictures, which showed a stable condition and the trend also slightly decreased. 
Figures 4-10 to 4-15 show the trend for each category of deficiency for the 
Indonesian ships compared with the Tokyo MoU figures. 
 
 
61 
 
 
Figure 4-8: Composition of the most detainable deficiencies, Indonesia 
 
Figure 4-9: Composition of the most detainable deficiencies, Tokyo MoU 
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Figure 4-10: The trend of deficiencies in the category of fire safety system 
 
Figure 4-11: The trend of deficiencies in the category of safety of navigation 
 
Figure 4-12: The trend of deficiencies in the category of life-saving appliances 
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Figure 4-13: The trend of deficiencies in the category of certificate and documentation 
 
Figure 4-14: The trend of deficiencies in the category of ISM-related 
 
Figure 4-15: The trend of deficiencies in the category of pollution prevention 
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The author views that, the deficiencies found in the category of certificate and 
documentation was interesting to be highlighted and discussed. Since as seen in 
Figures 4-8 and 4-13, deficiencies in this category shows the highest portion, and 
during 2012 to 2015, the trend for this category was increased. Above all, this 
category was hit the highest percentage in 2015 accounting for 27 % of the total 
deficiencies. Likewise, the deficiencies in the category of ISM-related were also 
considerably higher compared to the Tokyo MoU figures. Even in 2014, the 
deficiencies in this category accounted for 17 %, while only 3 % was recorded in the 
Tokyo MoU.  
4.4.3. Detention by ship types and age 
The analysis results from the ship detention lists revealed that the general cargo 
ship and bulk carrier were the most detained ship types during 2012 to 2015 (see 
Figure 4-16). Concerning the average age, approximately 40 % fell into the group of 
15 to 24 years old and roughly 50 % fell into the group of 25+ years old (see Figure 
4-17).  
 
Figure 4-16: Category of ship types mostly detained in the Tokyo MoU region 
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Figure 4-17: The average age of Indonesian ships detained in the Tokyo MoU region 
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5. Discussion of the analysis results 
This section provides the discussion of all of the analysis results of Indonesia’s 
performance discussed in Chapter 4. The discussion focuses on answering the 
research questions to meet the objectives of this study as stated earlier in Chapter 1.2.  
5.1 Ratification of international maritime treaties 
In determining flag State performance concerning the ratification of 
international conventions, the ICS only refers to the criteria whether the seven main 
Conventions have been ratified (ICS, 2015).26 It means that the ICS does not view 
the enforcement aspect at all. Accordingly, as long as States have ratified the 
Convention, the positive indicator will be labeled to such flag. Nonetheless, the ICS 
(2015) also noted that although such instruments have been ratified by a State, it does 
not necessarily affirm that those instruments are being properly enforced. That is 
why the author views that it is also important to check what is the reason behind the 
non-ratification of such Conventions. 
Concerning this aspect, the ICS labeled Indonesia as a negative or under-
performance flag because Indonesia has not yet ratified the following Conventions: 
(i) SOLAS Protocol 88; (ii) ICLL protocol 88; (iii) MLC 2006 and (iv) FUND 71 
including FUND 92. In addition, Indonesia has recorded a low speed in the 
ratification of the other conventions. In general, Indonesia ratified the Convention 
after such Convention had entered into force (see Table 5-1).  
 
                                                          
26 The ICS use the data of “Status of Conventions” available at IMO website (www.imo.org) and ILO  
website (www.ilo.org). 
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Table 5-1: Summary of the ratification of conventions 
No Instrument Adopted 
Entry into 
force 
No. of  
States 
% 
world 
tonnage 
Ratified by 
Indonesia? 
1 
SOLAS 1974 
01-Nov-
74 
25-May-
80 
162 98.53 
Yes  
09-Dec-80 
SOLAS Protocol 1988 
11-Nov-
88 
03-Feb-00 109 95.35 No 
2 
STCW 1978, incl 2010 
Amendments 
07-Jul-78 28-Apr-84 161 98.76 
Yes 
04-Dec-86 
3 
MARPOL  (Annex 
I/II) 
17-Feb-78 
02-Oct-83 154 98.73 
Yes 
09-Sep-86 
4 
MARPOL  (Annex III) 01-Jul-92 146 98.15 
Yes            
20-March-
12 
MARPOL  (Annex IV) 27-Sep-03 138 90.96 
MARPOL  (Annex V) 31-Dec-88 151 98.32 
MARPOL  (Annex VI) 
19-May-
05 
87 95.69 
5 
ICLL 1966 05-Apr-66 21-Jul-68 161 98.52 
Yes 
02-Nov-76 
ICLL Protocol 1988 
11-Nov-
88 
03-Feb-00 103 95.28 No 
6 MLC 2006 23-Feb-06 20-Aug-13 79 +80 No 
7 
CLC 1969 
29-Nov-
69 
19-Jun-75 34 2.74 
Yes 
02-Nov-76 
CLC Protocol 1992 
27-Nov-
92 
30-May-
96 
136 97.00 
  
28-May-99 
FUND 1971 18-Dec-71 16-Oct-78 
Cease to be in force on  24 
May 2002 
FUND Protocol 1992 
27-Nov-
92 
30-May-
96 
114 94.04 No 
 
In fact, there are many factors that influenced the willingness of the States to 
ratify the specific Convention. Mansel (2009, p. 155) stated that very often the 
political priorities, which are determined by the general condition of the shipping of 
the States, had become the reason constraining the ability of the States to bring the 
Convention into effect through their national legislation. In the author’s opinion, this 
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rationale could also be the case for Indonesia, particularly concerning the non-
ratification of the 1988 Protocol to SOLAS and the Load Line Conventions, which 
introduced the provision of the HSSC system. Since as seen in Table 1-1 (Chapter 1), 
although the share of the Indonesian fleets, in terms of tonnage, was only 1.15 % of 
the world total tonnage, the number of ships which were registered under the 
Indonesian flag, in terms of number, was quite high and even the second biggest in 
the world, below Panama. It means that most of the Indonesian ships were relatively 
small in terms of size. Table 1-1 also shows that the average age of Indonesian fleets 
was 19.3 years old. In addition, in line with the characteristic of Indonesia as an 
archipelagic country, those ships were largely employed in coastal and inter-island 
shipping.  
Probably, by looking into these facts, Indonesia views that the 1988 Protocol of 
the SOLAS and Load Line Conventions could not be applied to the Indonesian fleets 
in entirety. A similar view was also noted by UNCTAD (2015, p. 37), which stated 
that generally, the ships in the above category do not necessary fall under the 
umbrella of the IMO regulations. Therefore, instead of ratifying the above-mentioned 
Protocols, Indonesia has enforced the national legislation concerning the 
seaworthiness of the ships under the enactment of the Constitution of Republic 
Indonesia no. 17/2008, which supersedes the Constitution of Republic Indonesia no. 
21/1992. Subsequently, this Constitution has been followed by the stipulation of the 
Government Regulation no. 51/2002 (MoS, 2002). In the implementation aspect, the 
above Regulation (Government Regulation) was followed by the stipulation of the 
following regulations: 
(i) the Regulation of Ministry of Transport no. PM 20/2015, which mainly regulates 
the aspect of the safety standard in shipping (MoT, 2015). This regulation was 
followed by the stipulation of Regulation of the Director of DGST no. 
HK.103/2/19/DJPL-16, which covers the aspect of seaworthiness of the ships 
(DGST, 2016). 
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(ii) the Regulation of Ministry of Transport no. PM 39/2015, which supersedes the 
Regulation no. KM 3/2005. This Regulation covers the provision related to the 
Load Line of the ships (MoT, 2016). 
According to the above Regulations, Indonesia has continued maintaining its 
“conservative way” and no harmonization concept has been implemented in the 
issuance of those certificates. Practically, all certificates will be issued with the 
validity of a maximum one year except the Load Line certificate, which is valid for 
up to five years.27 With regard to the harmonized survey and certification system as 
set out in the 1988 Protocol of the SOLAS and Load Line Convention, all certificates 
for cargo ships should be valid for a maximum of five years and twelve months for 
the passenger ship safety certificate (see Appendix B). 
In addition, the author also views that the economic reason was also considered 
as the logic behind the low rates of the State’s willingness to ratify the new 
Convention. Very often the cost is always associated with the regulatory compliance 
to the Convention, which incurred not only in the initial phase of the implementation 
but also during the operational phase. The real example of this case was reflected in 
the case of the FUND 71 Convention including its 1992 Protocol which has not been 
ratified by Indonesia. On 10 March 1998, Indonesia enacted the President Decree no. 
41/1998, which revoked the President Decree no. 19/1978 (MoS, 1998). In the basic 
clause of President Decree no. 41/1998, it was clearly stated that the reason for 
Indonesia no longer having ratified the Convention was because: 
 being a Party to this Convention was made Indonesia burdened by a contribution 
which could aggravate the country’s budget. 
 Indonesia has already been a member State of the CLC 69, including Protocol 
1992. 
                                                          
27 The writer used the word of “conservative way” to demonstrated the custom practically 
implemented in Indonesia concerning the issuance of certificates by the DGST; which is three months 
for the short-term certificates and maximum one year for the permanent certificates.  
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5.2 Delegation authority complying with Resolution A.739(18) 
During the period from 2012 to 2015, the ICS labeled Indonesia as a good 
performance flag in this particular aspect. This recognition was given based on the 
fact that Indonesia has fulfilled (only) the aspects and indicators used by the ICS as 
described in Chapter 4.2. Hence, it does not necessarily affirm that the compliance 
with those indicators also confirmed the full compliance with Resolution A.739(18). 
There is also one aspect which is important to determine, namely the formal written 
agreement between the Maritime Administration and RO. As described in Chapter 
2.3, flag State may refer to the Appendix of RO Code and also MSC/Circ.710-
MEPC/Circ.307 (see Appendix C). In the case of Indonesia, this agreement has not 
yet been made. The data available in GISIS only provides the information on the 
recognition of BKI as the RO for the Indonesian flagged vessels. 
Subsequently, the analysis result has shown that all of the organizations which 
have been authorized by Indonesia were the classification societies, either the 
national classification society or the IACS members. In fact, the recognition of these 
groups of classification societies as the RO -national and IACS members-  was also 
reflected in the Indonesian policy concerning the obligation to register the ship. 
Under Article 3 of the Regulation of Ministry of Transport no. 61/2014 (MoT, 2014), 
it is stated that Indonesian ships are obliged to be registered into the classification 
societies, either: 
(i) National classification society (BKI), or 
(ii) Foreign classification societies  which are IACS members 
Meanwhile, according to Chapter 4.2.1, analysis of the detention ship list 
during 2012 to 2015 showed that the proportion of BKI as the RO recognized by 
Indonesia was dominant, where approximately sixty percent of Indonesian ships 
were authorized to BKI. Such figures were also reflected in the overall statistics of 
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Indonesian ships inspected in the Tokyo MoU region, 28 where it showed a similar 
pattern. Indeed, BKI as the RO shared almost fifty percent of the authorization and 
the remaining authorized were spread out under IACS members (see Figure 5-1). 
Figure 5-1 also shows that approximately six percents of Indonesian ship that have 
been detained were not authorized by the classification societies. It means that the 
survey and certification process for these ships were carried out by the 
Administration itself. 
 
Figure 5-1: Composition of RO: BKI vs. IACS members 
The dominant portion of the authorization by BKI was not surprising for 
Indonesia, since BKI was recognized as a national classification society. Indeed, the 
relation between DGST and BKI had existed for a long time, even since its 
establishment on 24 August 1964 (MoS, 1964). Considering the fact that, although 
BKI is not an IACS member, the Tokyo MoU has considered and included BKI in 
the group of high-performance ROs (Tokyo MoU, 2015a). Therefore, the author 
views that it is reasonable if Indonesia assumed BKI as its national asset and gain 
“special recognition”, of course, by considering the aspect of professionalism.  
                                                          
28 The statistics were collated from the Tokyo MoU database in the APCIS (Asia Pacific 
Computerized Information System). 
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In addition, the analysis result from the Tokyo MoU database has shown an 
interesting finding. From 2012 to 2015, a total 1,137 Indonesian fleets were 
inspected in the region and of 626 ships (corresponding to 55 %) were authorized by 
BKI. Among those 626 ships, 393 ships (corresponding to 63 %) were also registered 
under BKI (see Figure 5-2). Even, ninety percent of the ships inspected in the Tokyo 
MoU, registered under ABS, were also identified using ABS as their RO. This figure 
has demonstrated that it is customary in Indonesia that the classification society of 
the ship was often also recognized as the RO. 
 
Figure 5-2: The trend in Indonesia: the ship’s class also recognized as the RO 
5.3 Mandatory reporting requirement to the IMO and ILO 
Regarding the aspect of reporting requirement to the IMO, a good performance 
has been achieved by Indonesia in general. Indeed, concerning the reporting 
requirement to the ILO, during the period of 2012 to 2015, the reporting rate of 
Indonesia was recorded to be higher compared to the global reporting rate. Also, 
Indonesia has noted to be consistent in the STCW white list, even since the first list 
was published. Nonetheless, there is still lack and shortcomings in other aspects. 
Particularly, Indonesia has failed to conform to the mandatory reporting requirement 
under MARPOL and SOLAS. As seen in Table 5-2, the reporting rate of Indonesia 
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was still below the global reporting rate. Although these aspects (reporting under 
MARPOL and SOLAS) were not taken into account by the ICS when determining 
the flag State performance, it is, nevertheless, still important for Indonesia to 
recognize them as a means of self-assessment for the future improvement.  
Table 5-2: Summary of the status of reporting requirement to the IMO and ILO 
No 
Mandatory reporting 
requirements 
Reporting rate 
Note/Period 
Global  Indonesia 
1 MARPOL (Annex I & II) 25.50% 
no report 
(0 %) 
2008 - 2012 
2 
SOLAS (Casualty 
Investigation) 
47.16% 12.12% 
1 Jan. 2010 
- 31 March 
2015 
3 Authorization to RO (GISIS) outdated 29 updated 6 Aug. 2016 
4 STCW Convention - white list 2000 - 2015 
5 
Reporting requirement to the 
ILO 
69.53% 100% 2012 
74.12% 100% 2013 
71.71% 83.30% 2014 
69.70% 100% 2015 
 
5.4 Record of PSC inspection 
Regarding this aspect, it was clearly seen that the status of Indonesia as on the 
black-list flag was the main reason for Indonesia being considered as a negative or 
under performing flag by the ICS (see Table 5-3).  
Table 5-3: Summary of PSC inspection records, 2012 – 2015 
No. Aspects 
2012 2013 
Indonesia 
Tokyo 
MoU 
Indonesia 
Tokyo 
MoU 
1 
Total inspection 179 30,929 159 31,018 
Inspection with 
deficiency 
164 19,250 132 18,790 
Percentage (%) 91.62 62.24 83.02 60.58 
                                                          
29 As discussed in Chapter 4.2.2 
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2 
Ship detention 31 1,421 24 1,395 
Percentage (%) 17.32 4.59 15.09 4.50 
3 
“U" black-to-
grey 
19 - 17 - 
Status Black-list - Black-list - 
 
No. Aspects 
2014 2015 
Indonesia 
Tokyo 
MoU 
Indonesia 
Tokyo 
MoU 
1 
Total inspection 190 30,405 197 31,407 
Inspection with 
deficiency 
176 19,029 163 19,142 
Percentage (%) 92.63 62.59 82.74 60.95 
2 
Ship detention 25 1,203 36 1,153 
Percentage (%) 13.16 3.96 18.27 3.67 
3 
“U" black-to-grey 20 - 20 - 
Status Black-list - Black-list - 
 
Furthermore, Figure 5-3 shows the areas where the Indonesian ships were 
detained from 2012 to 2015, which are: China, Singapore, Australia, Vietnam, 
Malaysia, Republic of Korea, Thailand and Papua New Guinea. In addition, Figure 
5-3 also shows that China, Singapore and Australia were noted as the top three areas 
where Indonesian ships were mostly detained. Indeed, during 2015, more than 40 % 
of the Indonesian ships were detained in Singapore, while in 2013, more than 50 % 
were detained in China. Australia also recorded a high detention rate, particularly in 
2014 when approximately 40 % of the Indonesian ships were detained there.  
Meanwhile, these Authorities also carried out the PSC inspection on foreign 
vessels visiting their ports. The information concerning the detention rate produced 
by each Authority was provided by the Tokyo MoU in its annual report. The overall 
detention rate produced by all authorities will give the average detention rate in the 
regional Tokyo MoU. As seen in Figure 5-4, Indonesia still recorded a higher 
detention rate compared to the detention rate produced by each Authority.  
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Figure 5-3: Composition of the detention area 
 
Figure 5-4: Comparison of detention rate: Indonesia vs. Regional Authority 
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Subsequently, Figure 5-5 shows the comparison of the detention rate between 
Indonesia and the regional average in the Tokyo MoU. It is shown that, from 2012 to 
2015, Indonesia recorded a higher detention rate as compared to the regional 
average. Additionally, Figure 5-5 also indicates that from 2012 to 2015, the Tokyo 
MoU recorded a decreasing trend of the detention percentage. Similarly, Indonesia 
also noted a similar pattern from 2012 to 2014. Indeed, the detention rate was 
recorded at 17 % in 2012 and then continuously decreased to 13 % in 2014. 
However, in 2015 the detention rate increased to 18 %. The author views that the 
implementation of NIR applied by the Tokyo MoU in 2014 was the reason behind 
this high increment. According to the Tokyo MoU (2015a, p. 2), the inspection 
percentage of the high-risk ship [HRS] increased during this period. Indeed, there 
were approximately 34 % of the total 31,407 ships inspected in 2015 that were 
classified as the HRS (Tokyo MoU, 2015a, p. 25). 
 
Figure 5-5: Comparison of the detention rate: Indonesia vs. Tokyo MoU regional average 
Subsequently, with respect to the category of deficiencies, it was noted that 
there were six main categories of deficiencies that were frequently discovered during 
the PSC inspection. The interesting finding for Indonesia was the deficiencies in the 
category of certificate and documentation. As seen in Figure 5-6 and 5-7, 
deficiencies in this category show the highest value which is  opposite to the regional 
value in the Tokyo MoU. From 2012 to 2015, the trend for this category was 
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increased and above all, this category hit the highest point in 2015, accounting for 27 
% of the total deficiencies. Conversely, in the Tokyo MoU, the deficiencies in this 
category have ranged only between nine to twelve percent. 
 
Figure 5-6: Composition of the most detainable deficiencies, Indonesia 
 
Figure 5-7: Composition of the most detainable deficiencies, Tokyo MoU 
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To enhance the finding in this aspect (the most category of the deficiencies), 
the analysis was extended into all the Indonesian ships that have been inspected in 
the Tokyo MoU region. Interestingly, the analysis result indicated a similar pattern. 
As seen in Figure 5-8, the category of certificate and documentation was still the 
category which resulted in the highest number of deficiencies per category during the 
PSC inspection. In addition, the deficiencies in this category also showed a similar 
trend (see Figure 5-9). 
 
Figure 5-8: The most detainable deficiencies found for all of the Indonesian ships that 
have been inspected in the Tokyo MoU 
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Figure 5-9: The trend of deficiencies in the category of certificate & documentation: 
Detention list vs. All Indonesian ships inspected in the Tokyo MoU 
region 
According to the deficiency codes (Tokyo MoU, 2015b), the deficiency in the 
category of certificate and documentation was divided into three sub-categories: ship 
certificates, crew certificates and ship documents. Furthermore, the analysis indicates 
that there was a linkage between the non-ratification of the1988 Protocol of SOLAS 
and the Load Line Convention with  high number of findings in this category. This 
linkage was reflected by the analysis result which showed that the majority of 
deficiencies found in this category had fallen in the sub-category of ship certificates -
which are related to the HSSC provision-. Indeed, the number of deficiencies that 
have been found in this sub-category were higher compared to the other sub-
categories (see Figure 5-10). 
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Figure 5-10: The composition of deficiencies in the category of certificate and 
documentation 
Likewise, the deficiencies in the category of ISM-related was also considerably 
high. Even in 2014, the deficiencies in this category accounted for 17 % (nearly 
tripled from the previous year), while only 3 % was recorded in the regional Tokyo 
MoU. In fact, this steep increment was the impact of the concentrated inspection 
campaign [CIC] on propulsion and auxiliary machinery, which was conducted from 
1 September to 30 November 2013. According to the 2014 detention list, the 
majority of the deficiencies found in this category were covered in the aspect of 
maintenance and operational of the ship, which is related to the implementation of 
the ISM Code. Therefore, PSC inspectors associated these deficiencies to the ISM-
related category. 
Apart from those six categories, there is another finding which invokes interest, 
and is related to the deficiencies in the MLC-related category. As described in 
Chapter 2.2.2 and Chapter 4.1, the MLC 2006 convention has the clause of “no more 
favourable treatment.” The impact of this clause has been experienced by Indonesia 
since 2014, wherein 2014 and 2015 approximately three percent of the Indonesian 
ships were detained in the Tokyo MoU region due to the findings in this area. 
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Lastly, with respect to the responsible party to the deficiencies found as 
described in Chapter 3.2.3, the analysis results showed that less than three percent of 
the deficiencies were attributed to the RO. Even in 2013 and 2015, none of the RO’s 
responsible for the deficiencies were recorded (see Figure 5-11). Furthermore, in 
relation with the most detainable deficiencies as seen in Figure 5-6, the analysis 
result showed that none of them were attributed to the RO. In the author’s opinion, 
the above condition was closely related to the mechanism applied by Indonesia in 
delegating its authority since it was recognized that Indonesia had implemented the 
so-called “partial authorization” where authorizations were given on a case-by-case 
basis. In practice, this condition means that: 
(i) RO may only issue the interim or short-term certificate. The Administration will 
issue the permanent certificate following the reports submitted by the RO.  
(ii) The survey and audit including the endorsement of certificates can be carried out 
by the Administration at any time.  
 
 
Figure 5-11: Composition of responsible party to the detainable deficiencies 
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5.5 Ship type and age of fleet 
With respect to the flag performance, it is strongly emphasized that the age of 
ships is not the indicator of the quality of the ship. However, ICS (2015) noted that 
flags that have a concentration of younger fleets are probably more prone to quality 
ships.  Therefore, as a positive indicator, ICS sorted 90 % of the flags that have the 
lowest average age in terms of ship numbers and included them in the list of good 
performance flags. From 2012 to 2015, Indonesia has been included in this list. In 
addition, as described in Chapter 4.4.3, the general cargo ship and bulk carrier were 
the most detained ship types from 2012 to 2015. This finding was not surprising for 
Indonesia, since a similar pattern was also found in the Tokyo MoU. For the same 
period, these two ship types were also recorded as the the most detained ship type in 
the region. 
Concerning the age of fleets, the analysis discovered that the average age of the 
general cargo ship and bulk carrier detained mostly fell in the group of 25+ years old. 
Indeed, more than sixty percent of the bulk carriers and approximately forty percent 
of general cargo ships fell in this category (see Figure 5-12). This figure was 
coincident with the statistic published by the Equasis, concerning the average age of 
the ship inspected from 2012 to 2014 in the PSC region (Equasis, 2014, p. 71).  
 
Figure 5-12: Composition of ship age for general cargo ship and bulk carrier 
  
 
 
 
 
6. Conclusion and recommendations 
Considering the research questions outlined in Chapter 1, this dissertation has 
demonstrated that Indonesia’s performance is not only determined by the position of 
Indonesia as a black-list country in the Tokyo MoU but also by other factors such as 
the non-ratification of international conventions. In addition, this study has explained 
the relationship between maritime administration in Indonesia and ROs regarding the 
delegation authority. A possible measure to address several issues discovered in the 
analysis is proposed as the recommendation.  
6.1 Summary 
To summarize, this study demonstrated that Indonesia had shown a good 
performance in general, certainly with drawbacks and scarcity in some aspects. First 
of all, concerning the ratification of the Convention, Indonesia still experiences a 
delay in the speed at which ratification occurs. In detail, the following Conventions 
have not yet been ratified by Indonesia: (i) Protocol 88 of SOLAS; (ii) Protocol 88 of 
Load Line; (iii) MLC 2006 and (iv) FUND 71/92 Convention. This study has argued 
that the political and economic constraints may be the main reason for Indonesia to 
lag behind in the ratification process. 
Secondly, with respect to the aspect of delegation authority to the RO, 
Indonesia has recorded its compliance to the IMO regulation, specifically Resolution 
A.739(18). From 2012 to 2015, Indonesia delegated its authority to the organizations 
which are mainly classification societies, either national (BKI) or foreign 
classification societies (IACS members). BKI, which was known as the national 
classification society, was the most authorized RO with the sharing about fifty 
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percent and the remaining fifty percent shared was spread out among the other 
classification societies which are the IACS members. In addition, this study also 
revealed that, as a customary in Indonesia, the classification society of the ship is 
often also identified as the ship’s RO.  
The third aspect discussed in this study was the reporting requirement to the 
IMO and ILO. Indonesia still recorded a low reporting rate about reporting to the 
IMO. For instance, Indonesia has recorded a low reporting rate concerning SOLAS 
and even worse, the failure to submit any reports as required under MARPOL. 
Instead, a good performance regarding reporting under STCW Convention has been 
indicated, where Indonesia was considered as one of the STCW white list countries 
from 2000 to 2015. Furthermore, with regard to the reporting requirement on the 
delegation authority to the RO, Indonesia has updated the necessary information 
through GISIS. Indonesia also showed its compliance concerning the reporting 
requirement to the ILO by noting a higher reporting rate compared to the global rate.  
Subsequently, concerning the record of PSC inspections in the Tokyo MoU, 
the inclusion of Indonesia on the black-list was deemed to be the main reason behind 
its poor performance level. Additionally Indonesia has recorded a higher detention 
rate compared to the regional average. In addition, this study determined China, 
Singapore and Australia as the top three detention areas which have recorded 
deficiencies in the category of certificate and documentation as the most detainable 
deficiencies which was frequently discovered during PSC inspection. 
Furthermore, this study has identified that, the Administration (or shipowners) 
itself, was the most responsible party of the detainable deficiencies found during the 
PSC inspection. The analysis has manifested that less than three percent of the 
deficiencies were attributed to the RO. Instead, no RO-responsible deficiency was 
found in 2013 and 2015. The study has argued that this figure corresponds to the 
condition of the so-called “partial authorization” implemented by Indonesia in 
delegating its authority. Moreover, this study has indicated that the general cargo 
ship and bulk carrier were the most common ship types detained in the region from 
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2012 to 2015. Moreover, the average age of those ships were in the range of 25+ 
years old.  
Lastly, this study has also indicated the relationship between the impact of non-
ratification of the 1988 Protocols of SOLAS and Load Line Convention with the 
tremendous findings in the category of certificate and documentation. Also there is a 
linkage between the impact of non-ratification of the MLC 2006 with the findings in 
the category of MLC-related. Indeed, the existence of “no more favourable 
treatment” clause in these conventions contributed to the numerous deficiencies 
found during PSC inspections. 
To conclude, it has been demonstrated by this study that the performance of 
flag States was not  determined by a single aspect individually. Nonetheless, all 
aspects have contributed to each other. Therefore, the measures for improvement 
should not be performed partially. Instead, such measures should be carried out in a 
comprehensive way by considering every aspect altogether.  
6.2 Recommendations  
As a complement,  several recommendations have been proposed as a follow-
up to the analysis and discussion performed in the previous chapters. Referring to the 
objective as outlined before, it was the purpose of this study to find the possible 
measure to improve the effectiveness of Indonesia (as a flag State) in exercising its 
obligations. Therefore, several measures which could be implemented by Indonesia 
for the future improvement are proposed in the folowing: 
a) Ratifying  the 1988 SOLAS Protocol, the 1988 Load Line Protocol and the MLC 
2006 
As described in the summary, ratification of these Conventions will in turns have 
an impact on the PSC inspection result. Specifically, by ratifying these 
Conventions, the number of related deficiencies will be reduced accordingly. 
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b) Enhancing the flag State inspection 
This measure could be applied by implementing stricter flag State inspections 
and also by conducting regular training to flag State inspectors. 
c) Implementing full authorization to the RO  
Considering its limitations and shortcomings in terms of resources, implementing 
the full authorization to the RO would make Indonesia be more focused on the 
implementation aspect of the IMO instrument as required by the III Code. 
Certainly, such authorization should be followed by the consistent monitoring 
aspect (oversight program). In the end, this condition will foster the 
professionalism of RO when performing delegated tasks according to the formal 
written agreement that has been made.  
d) Providing the familiarization to the shipowners on the importance of ship 
maintenance in accordance with the ISM Code 
By providing the familiarization to the shipowners will encourage their 
awareness that the condition of the individual ship is ultimately determined by 
the standard of ship maintenance. 
e) Restricting the age of national fleets 
This measure could be implemented by setting the national policy in promoting 
the new building ships in the country and establishing the threshold age for the 
imported existing ships. As such, close cooperation between all stakeholders 
(Indonesia as the government and the shipowners/shipping industry) is obviously 
needed for the success of this policy.  
  
*** 
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